Transforming the state, challenging the nation: the role of identity politics in the Brexit vote by Mendelsohn, Rebecca
Macalester College
DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Political Science Honors Projects Political Science Department
Spring 4-24-2017
Transforming the state, challenging the nation: the
role of identity politics in the Brexit vote
Rebecca Mendelsohn
Macalester College, rmendels@macalester.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mendelsohn, Rebecca, "Transforming the state, challenging the nation: the role of identity politics in the Brexit vote" (2017). Political
Science Honors Projects. 65.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/65
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transforming the state, challenging the nation: the role of 
identity politics in the Brexit vote 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rebecca Mendelsohn  
Professor Wendy Weber 
Department of Political Science  
April 24, 2017 
 
 
  
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 3 
Abstract  
 
British voters have decided to withdraw membership from the European Union (EU). By 
considering the outcome of Brexit as a moment in time when British voters declared, “this is 
who we are,” this project asks: What role did identity play in the Brexit vote? What does Brexit 
tell us about how expressions of identity have been affected by transformations of the state? An 
internal conflict over what it means to be British has, in part, driven the United Kingdom to leave 
the EU. Neither British Euroscepticism nor competing notions of Britishness are new. Rather, 
anxiety over the ability to dictate what Britishness is, and who can be British came to a point of 
crisis on June 23, 2016. My analysis demonstrates that this crisis was provoked by three points of 
tension: (1) shifts of sovereignty from member states to the EU, (2) the rise of immigration, and 
(3) resentment among the British working-class. Ultimately, these three issues contributed to the 
victory of the New Right vision of identity and the British voters’ decision to leave the EU. 
Further, I suggest that Brexit raises concerns about the consequences of exclusionary identity 
politics, as national identity seems to have become a mechanism through which our globalizing 
world is rejected, and familiarity and homogeneity are favored over difference.  
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Preface  
 
 This project is the result of an attempt to pull together many interests: to look at 
international relations, the state and the nation, exclusionary identity politics, and the movements 
of people. Motivated by a desire to understand the ways in which the local and the distant, the 
national and the supranational interact with one another, I ended up at June 23, 2016 and 
Britain’s decision to withdraw membership from the European Union. As processes and effects 
of globalization are having a profound effect on systems of governance, economic exchange, and 
social interactions, there is a need to examine the transformation the state undergoes when 
interacting with supranational political communities. Will supranational bodies including the 
European Union continue to emerge and strengthen? Or, will independence referendums such as 
Brexit become more popular? There is something that needs to be said about the compatibility of 
the nation, and thus national identity, in the context of an increasingly globalized world order. If 
Brexit exemplifies the rejection of a certain kind of identity — supranational, transnational, 
cosmopolitan — in favor of another, British national identity, it is imperative to ask, is the world 
ready to open borders and minds? Are nationalist, exclusionary politics eradicable?  
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Chapter 1: The Road to Brexit 
 
On June 23, 2016 over thiry million Britons turned out to the polls, called on to 
participate in one of the most anticipated and globally significant votes in recent memory. Forty-
three years after becoming a member of the European Union (EU), Britain decided it was time to 
reevaluate its membership status. This was the first independence referendum ever held by a EU 
member-state, and the consequences of a Brexit vote were unclear. Yet, as the country prepared 
to make a statement about what it means to be British, the Brexit vote commanded the world’s 
attention; as seventy-two percent of the British electorate filled out the referendum ballot, the 
rest of the world stood still, anxiously awaiting David Cameron’s appearance outside Number 10 
Downing Street.1 And then, all of a sudden, it happened. In a speech that lasted less than eight 
minutes, former Prime Minister Cameron addressed his constituents, and the world. The people 
had spoken. Britain would leave the EU. 
In many ways, both nations and states across the world today are in conversation with 
each other more than ever before. Political and national communities are in the throes of 
complex processes of globalization, building relationships and partnerships across borders in 
response. Globalization contemplates that, through a series of mechanisms, both the citizens and 
economies of nations and states around the world become more closely interconnected, and will 
continue to become more closely interconnected.2 This “coming together” of our world is the 
direct result of trends and processes, at both the national and the international level. As a result, 
new forms of economic, social and political organization have been produced and the 
development of global communication, production and exchange has been encouraged.  
                                                        
1 Lord Ashcroft, “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and Why,” Lord Ashcroft Polls, June 24, 2016, 
http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/. 
2 Professor Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (SAGE, 1992); Saskia Sassen, 
Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money ({New Press}, 1999), 
http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/redirect?tag=citeulike09-20&path=ASIN/1565845188. 
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One context in which issues of globalization have been explored is the EU, as it has 
brought twenty-eight states together “with their respective histories, different cultures, different 
languages, different political, national, regional and local interests and traditional ideologies, 
different economic concepts and so forth.”3 Within a union of over two-dozen states, each with 
its own way of life, there is a need to first acknowledge these stark differences and then to 
construct commonalities. The EU has therefore simultaneously demanded and necessitated the 
merger of market economies, the increased malleability of borders, the expansion of 
communication networks, and the growth of migration. Over the course of its history the EU has 
itself been transformed from a coalition that monitored the production of coal and steel, into an 
economic, social and political union. The supranational policies and institutions that have caused 
this to happen have relied on direct interaction and cooperation between national and 
supranational bodies of governance and policy. The EU thus offers a useful framework through 
which to analyze the relationship between identity and transformations of the state, making it an 
appropriate focus of my research. 
Significantly, globalization has not occurred without conflict. In fact, it introduces urgent 
paradoxes, contradictions that put the local and the distant, the particular and the universal 
through periods of tension. In some cases, the increasing ease with which corners of the world 
interact with one another results in the universalization of values and opinions regarding public 
policy; while in many other cases, the perceived erosion of an imagined national homogeneity 
catalyzes expressions of xenophobic paranoia: a fear of the other that has contributed to 
exclusionary identity politics. In this sense, globalization has implicated expressions and 
understandings of identity. As will be elaborated, this project examines these implications in an 
                                                        
3 Michał Krzyżanowski and Ruth Wodak, “Political Strategies and Language Policies: The European Union Lisbon 
Strategy and Its Implications for the EU’s Language and Multilingualism Policy,” Language Policy 10, no. 2 (May 
2011): 115–36, doi:10.1007/s10993-011-9196-5. 
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effort to clarify how identity manifests in moments of perceived crisis. Although the term 
identity is used widely and can apply to many different situations, in this context it is used to 
describe a sense of belonging to a national community — one which has been affected by 
transformations of the state.  
The Brexit vote represents one of such paradox of globalization, reflecting the effects of 
tensions between competing forms of identity. It demonstrates a reaction against phenomena 
such as transnationalism and cosmopolitanism — both of which have been perceived as threats 
to what it means to be British. Building on literature on transformations of the state in the context 
of globalization, I connect “state” with a set of exclusionary identity politics. The Brexit vote 
emphasizes how national identity can become a mechanism through which our globalizing world 
is rejected, allowing familiarity and homogeneity to be favored over difference.   
This project asks: What role did identity play in the Brexit vote? What does Brexit tell us 
about how expressions of identity have been affected by transformations of the state? An 
ascendency of New Right Britishness has, in part, driven the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the 
EU. While neither British Euroscepticism nor competing notions of British national identity are 
new, recent transformations of the state have triggered latent New Right identity characteristics. 
My analysis demonstrates that the transformations that contributed to this rise of New Right 
Britishness include: (1) shifts of sovereignty from member states to the EU, (2) the rise of 
immigration, and (3) anti-elitist sentiments among the working-class. Importantly, it was the 
combination and persistence of these three issues that allowed the New Right vision to rise. 
Consequently, New Right anxiety over the ability to dictate what British national identity is and 
who can be British came to a point of crisis on June 23, 2016. My discussion of Brexit can 
therefore be understood as a case study of what can happen when New Right identities prevail.  
 10 
Significance 
         
This project contributes to the growing body of literature on transformations of the state 
in the context of globalization. In the 1990s, this literature was characterized by a debate over the 
potential erasure of the state. While some pointed to the diminishing feasibility of the state as the 
globalized world’s primary unit of governance, others believed that the state would continue to 
be the primary embodiment of sovereignty.4 The academic conversation has since moved beyond 
this debate. Scholars today have reframed this discussion, focusing on how the interaction 
between globalization and the state has caused the state to transform.5 Brought on by the 
development of supranational institutions of governance and the merger of market economies, 
these transformations have redefined state sovereignty and altered notions of national identity.6 
                                                        
4 J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 559–92, 
doi:10.2307/2009684; Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,” 
World Politics 50, no. 1 (1997): 62–87; Jurgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State and the Pressures of 
Globalization,” New Left Review, no. 235 (May 1999): 46; Suzanne Berger, “Globalization and Politics,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (June 2000): 43–62, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.43; Martin Wolf, “Will the 
Nation-State Survive Globalization?,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 1 (2001): 178, doi:10.2307/20050051; Barry 
Eichengreen and David Leblang, “Democracy and Globalization,” Economics & Politics 20, no. 3 (November 
2008): 289–334, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00329.x. 
5 Linda Weiss, “Globalization and National Governance: Antinomy or Interdependence?,” Review of International 
Studies 25, no. 5 (December 1999): 59–88, doi:10.1017/S0260210599000595; Arthur A. Stein, “The Great 
Trilemma: Are Globalization, Democracy, and Sovereignty Compatible?,” International Theory 8, no. 2 (July 
2016): 297–340, doi:10.1017/S1752971916000063. 
6 Habermas, “The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization”; Stephen Castles, “Migration and 
Community Formation under Conditions of Globalization,” The International Migration Review 36, no. 4 (2002): 
1143–68; Sheila Croucher, Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity in a Changing World (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Roland Axtmann, “The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and Its 
Contemporary Transformation,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): 259–79, 
doi:10.1177/0192512104043016; Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg, and Gökçe Yurdakul, “Citizenship and 
Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State,” Annual Review of Sociology 34, 
no. 1 (2008): 153–79, doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134608; Professor of Transnational Anthropology Steven 
Vertovec and Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism (Routledge, 2009); Christina Higgins, Identity Formation in 
Globalizing Contexts: Language Learning in the New Millennium (Walter de Gruyter, 2011); Theresa Kuhn, 
“Individual Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism: An Empirical Test of Deutsch’s Transactionalist 
Theory: Individual Transnationalism, Globalisation and Euroscepticism,” European Journal of Political Research 
50, no. 6 (October 2011): 811–37, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01987.x; Gal Ariely, “Globalisation and the 
Decline of National Identity? An Exploration across Sixty-Three Countries: Globalisation and the Decline of 
National Identity,” Nations and Nationalism 18, no. 3 (July 2012): 461–82, doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00532.x; 
Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson, and Simon Bromley, Globalization in Question (John Wiley & Sons, 2015); Wu 
Zhicheng, “The Influence of Global Governance upon State Governance,” Social Sciences in China 37, no. 4 
(October 2016): 164–74, doi:10.1080/02529203.2016.1241501. 
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In this manner, relevant literature outlines a scholarly project rooted in efforts to understand how 
these transformations have manifested as well as what their broader consequences are. 
        The significance of this project is its ability to use Brexit as a way to examine 
consequences of transformations of the state today. My analysis builds on the emerging body of 
literature on Brexit. Scholarship has begun to comment on the role of migration and a history of 
British Euroscepticism in the independence referendum.7 Academics including Freeden (2017) 
and Ford and Goodwin (2017) have also connected the Brexit vote to issues of identity and 
political ideology. I am invested in understanding the intersection between issues of national 
identity and Euroscepticism, as well as sovereignty, migration and the economy. In this manner, 
this project expands and combines the thinking presented in new literature, offering a unique 
perspective on how effects of supranationalism caused Britain to insulate itself, promising to 
“take back control” from Eastern Europeans migrants and Muslim refugees, and from 
cosmopolitan elites and an overbearing European Council. 
Method 
 
In order to answer my research questions, I begin with a discussion of British 
Euroscepticism and how competing notions of British national identity have reacted to the ways 
the EU has both challenged and transformed the sovereignty of its member states. More 
specifically, I consider why membership to the EU was perceived as a threat to what it means to 
be British. Subsequently, I examine the role of national identity in relation to three of the most 
salient issues debated by the Leave and Remain campaigns — sovereignty, immigration and the 
economy. In order to make the claim that these three issues contributed to the ascendency of 
                                                        
7 Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, “A Nation Divided,” Journal of Democracy; Baltimore 28, no. 1 (January 
2017): 17–30; Michael Freeden, “After the Brexit Referendum: Revisiting Populism as an Ideology,” Journal of 
Political Ideologies; Abingdon 22, no. 1 (February 2017): 1–11, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.macalester.edu/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813. 
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New Right Britishness, I draw on available qualitative data from opinion polls, newspaper 
articles and campaign speeches. By focusing my research on the role of identity in the context of 
Brexit I am able to provide a more detailed and comprehensive analysis, with the potential to 
build on relevant theory about how supranationalism has caused transformations of state 
sovereignty and national identity. It is important to acknowledge, however, that limiting the 
number of cases considered makes it more likely that a case may be atypical. What the role of 
identity in the Brexit vote tells us about how expressions of identity have reacted to 
transformations of the state may only apply to Britain and British identity. That said, this 
analysis aims to build on existing theory, not test it. It offers a contemporary moment in time that 
can be used to elaborate on literature on the role of identity in the context of the growing 
supranational regime.   
Brexit  
 
On Thursday June 23, 2016, Britain voted to withdraw membership from the European 
Union.8 This vote, famously labeled Brexit, was decided by a fifty-two to forty-eight percent 
margin, with over thirty million Britons turning out to vote.9 On a practical level, the vote took 
place because Prime Minister Cameron promised it would. When Cameron promised an In/Out 
vote he assumed that the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, his coalition partners in governing Britain 
since Labour lost office in 2010, would still be around to veto the referendum.10 After the May 
2015 general elections, however, Cameron only had a small overall majority. Instead of stalling 
until 2017, Cameron recognized that the political climate was moving against him. Issues 
                                                        
8 Brian Wheeler and Alex Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU,” BBC News, 
October 2, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887. 
9 Ibid. 
10 White, “What Is Brexit and Why Does It Matter? The EU Referendum Guide for Americans.” 
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surrounding migration and the economy were said to have plagued state sovereignty, calling 
British national identity and autonomy into question.  
In the months leading up to the Brexit vote, fierce debates were brought to the forefront 
of domestic politics. Both the Leave and Remain campaigns fought to persuade voters as they 
were asked: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the 
European Union?” The two campaigns each presented their views on a wide range of issues, 
including immigration, state sovereignty, the economy, crime, trade and jobs. Campaign efforts 
targeted a large population as adult citizens of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
were all able to vote, along with Irish citizens who live in the country, citizens from the 
Commonwealth countries who reside in the UK, and UK nationals who have lived outside the 
country for less than fifteen years. By the end of several contentious months, Leave secured the 
majority vote. 
As evidenced by Table 1, the Leave campaign was able to capture the majority of the 
vote in England and Wales. Remain, however, persevered in Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Overall, support for Brexit was most substantial in England. Considering the breakdown of the 
Brexit vote more closely, it is clear that turnout was generally higher in pro-leave areas.11 
Interestingly, public support for Leave closely mapped support for the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP), as Euroscepticism appears to have spread across the country. 
Overall, Leave enjoyed support in areas that tended to be more economically disadvantaged than 
average, where average levels of education are low and the population is majority white.12 
Likewise, Leave polled well among older voters, and those with less stable employment.13 
                                                        
11 Matthew J. Goodwin and Oliver Heath, “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-Level 
Analysis of the Result,” The Political Quarterly 87, no. 3 (July 1, 2016): 323–32, doi:10.1111/1467-923X.12285. 1.  
12 Ibid. 4.  
13 Lord Ashcroft, “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and Why.” 
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Focusing more heavily on issues of immigration in the final weeks of its campaign, Leave 
received its strongest support in the West Midlands (59.3 percent), a typically Eurosceptic, and 
anti-immigrant region.14  
On the other side, Remain received its strongest support in Gibralter (95.9 percent). “Of 
the 50 local authorities where the remain vote was strongest, 39 were in London or Scotland.”15 
Although, at seventy-two percent, the overall turnout for the Brexit vote was the highest it has 
been since the 1992 general election, turnout was not even across the country. For example, 
despite the Remain campaign’s targeting of urban, more densely populated areas, turnout in 
these places tended to fall below the national average.16  
 
Table 1: Geographical Breakdown of Brexit Vote17 
Country Leave (percentage of vote) Remain (percentage of vote) 
England 53.4% 46.6% 
Wales 52.5% 47.5% 
Scotland 38% 62% 
Northern Ireland 44.2% 55.8% 
 
 
Of additional importance is both the age and rural/urban divide. Significantly, the 
younger the voter, the more likely they were to vote Remain. In fact, seventy-three percent of 
eighteen to twenty four year olds voted this way.18 Older voters, however, were overwhelmingly 
in support of the Leave campaign, with approximately sixty percent voicing their opposition 
towards the EU. This difference in opinion among age groups has been, in part, connected to a 
difference in perception about what the EU offers. For younger British citizens, the EU is a 
                                                        
14 Goodwin and Heath, “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind.”  
15 Ibid. 
16 For a more detailed account of the specific cities in which the Leave and Remain campaigns enjoyed the greatest 
success, and correlating statistics, please see: Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Jon Kelly, “Brexit: How Much of a Generation Gap Is There?,” BBC News, June 24, 2016, sec. Magazine, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36619342. 
 15 
“world of opportunity,” a space in which travel, work and new opportunities are unrestricted.19 
British pensioners, however, remain much more skeptical about the potential influences the EU 
may have on Britain and the towns in which they have resided their whole lives. Interestingly, 
this disagreement can also be seen in the geographical divide of the Brexit vote. Urban areas, 
including London, Manchester and Brighton adamantly backed Remain. The majority of rural 
communities, however, tended to vote the other way.  
The results of the Brexit vote have caused tensions at the subnational level. In Scotland 
particularly there has been significant outcry.20 In fact, Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s First 
Minister, has said that a second independence referendum in the next two-and-one-half years is 
highly likely.21 In Ireland, things are slightly more complicated. While nationalists want the UK 
to remain in the EU, unionists generally want to leave.22 Additionally, a Brexit will complicate 
border issues for Ireland, as EU nationals would no longer enjoy the right to move freely 
between the Republic of Ireland and the UK. Consequently, this may strain North-South 
relations. “Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness said the impact in Northern Ireland would 
be ‘very profound’ and that the whole island of Ireland should now be able to vote on 
reunification.  
As outlined in Table 2, the arguments made by the Leave and Remain campaigns touched 
on economic, social, political, and judicial issues. Generally, the Leave campaign advocated for a 
return to complete British sovereignty, while Remain attempted to highlight the advantages, in 
terms of both domestic and foreign affairs, of continued EU membership. Additionally, Remain 
                                                        
19 “How Britain’s Old Forced the Young to Leave the E.U.,” Time, accessed March 2, 2017, 
http://time.com/4381878/brexit-generation-gap-older-younger-voters/. 
20 Peter Foster; Emily Allen, “How Would Brexit Affect Northern Ireland and Scotland?,” The Telegraph, 11:02, 
sec. 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/09/how-would-brexit-affect-northern-ireland-and-scotland/. ; 
Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.” 
21 Allen, “How Would Brexit Affect Northern Ireland and Scotland?” ; Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to 
Know about the UK Leaving the EU.”  
22 Allen, “How Would Brexit Affect Northern Ireland and Scotland?” 
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stressed the ways in which the supranational EU institutions support, and do not hinder British 
national interests.  
Table 2: Main arguments presented by Leave and Remain Campaigns on Key Issues23 
                                                        
23 Ben Riley-Smith, “Leave or Remain in the EU? The Arguments for and against Brexit,” The Telegraph, June 20, 
2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/16/leave-or-remain-in-the-eu-the-arguments-for-and-against-
brexit/. ; John Cassidy, “The Economic Arguments Against Brexit,” The New Yorker, May 23, 2016, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-economic-arguments-against-brexit. ; Larry Elliott Economics 
editor, “The Progressive Argument for Leaving the EU Is Not Being Heard,” The Guardian, June 19, 2016, sec. 
Business, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/19/progressive-argument-for-leaving-eu-is-not-being-
heard-referendum-brexit.  
Issue Leave Remain 
Immigration  Freedom of movement protected by the EU 
inhibits Britain’s ability to control immigration  
Leaving will not solve the migration 
crisis but rather bring it to Britain’s 
doorstep because border control will 
move from Calais, France to Dover 
Crime The European Arrest Warrant allows British 
citizens to be sent abroad and charged for 
offenses, often mirror ones 
Exit would stop justice being done 
through the European Arrest Warrant, 
which holds rapists, murderers and other 
serious criminals accountable 
Trade Britain’s links with the EU are hold back its 
focuses on emerging markets, namely China 
and India 
44 percent of Britain’s exports go to 
other EU countries  
Law Too many of Britain’s laws are made overseas 
by dictates passed down from Brussels. UK 
Courts must become sovereign again 
The exit campaign has over-exaggerated 
how many laws are determined by the 
European Commission. It is better to be 
a part of the process that shapes EU-
wide laws  
Jobs The danger posed to jobs if the UK leaves the 
EU has been exaggerated. By incentivizing 
investment through low corporation tax, Britain 
can flourish like the Scandinavian countries 
outside the EU have 
Around three million jobs are linked to 
the EU and will be plunged into 
uncertainty if Britain leaves 
Clout Britain does not need the EU to prosper 
internationally 
In a globalizing world the UK’s 
interests are best protected by remaining 
part of the EU block 
Finance Capital flight is nonsense, London will remain 
a leading financial center 
Banks would leave the UK and the City 
of London because of the trading 
advantages of being inside the EU 
Sovereignty  The British Parliament is no longer sovereign 
and the EU is determined on creating an even 
closer union 
In a globalized world, every country 
must work together if they want to 
prosper economically  
Defense  Britain may soon be asked to contribute to a EU 
Army, this would erode the UK’s independent 
military force 
European countries are facing threats 
from ISIS and a resurgent Russia. 
Working together is the best way to 
combat these challenges 
 17 
On March 29, 2016, Britain triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, officially initiating 
the withdrawal process. While no other member state has ever invoked Article 50, Britain now 
has two years to negotiate with the EU terms of exit. This two-year time frame can only be 
extended by unanimous agreement by EU member states. Britain’s formal exit is therefore likely 
to occur on March 29, 2019.24 The activation of Article 50 was initially delayed by an attempt to 
give Members of Parliament (MPs) a stronger voice in the withdrawal process.25 Many believed 
this is was necessary because “it has been estimated that while 421 of the 574 constituencies in 
England and Wales voted to leave the EU, only 148 MPs in England and Wales voted the same 
way.”26 Although May’s government rejected such calls saying that its mandate comes from the 
referendum results, on November 3, 2016, Britain’s High Court ruled that Parliament must give 
approval before exit processes begin.27 The UK Supreme Court affirmed this ruling. Despite the 
additional vote, Parliament affirmed the referendum results.  
The nature of the Brexit is dependent on the outcome of negotiations between Britain and 
the EU. At the moment, there appear to be two plausible outcomes.  
At one extreme, a ‘hard’ Brexit could involve the UK refusing to compromise on issues 
like the free movement of people in order to maintain access to the EU single market. At 
the other end of the scale, a ‘soft’ Brexit might follow a similar path to Norway, which is 
a member of the single market and has to accept the free movement of people as a 
result.28  
 
That said, May has taken a bold stance going into negotiations, making it clear that she is willing 
to leave the Single Market in order to regain control over immigration and sovereignty in various 
                                                        
24 Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.” 
25 “Brexit Britain: What Has Actually Happened so Far?,” BBC News, October 27, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36956418. 
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policy areas.29 The British government has yet to announce a firm position about how the status 
of EU citizens living within the UK will be affected. In part, this is contingent on trade deals 
established through the negotiations and if Britons working and residing in other EU countries 
will now have to apply for visas.30  
Importantly, “with nationalism and anti-establishment, anti-immigrant sentiment 
spreading across Western Europe, the EU leadership in Brussels is anxious to avoid encouraging 
others in the 28-member bloc to bolt.”31 A week before Britain formally triggered Article 50, 
Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, announced, “when a country leaves the union, 
there is no punishment. There is no price to pay to leave, but we must settle the accounts. No 
more, no less. We will not ask the British to pay a single euro for something they have not 
agreed to as a member.”32 Negotiations between Britain and the EU are therefore likely to 
include lengthy discussions on Britain’s outstanding financial obligations. It is estimated that the 
UK’s unpaid bill ranges from 55 to 60 billion euros. Regardless of the outcome of negotiations, 
the process will be very complicated. As both the EU and Britain have made clear, no detail will 
be left untouched. If no agreement is reached by March 29, 2019, and no extension has been 
granted, Britain automatically leaves the EU and all existing agreements cease to apply to the 
UK.33 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 “Britain’s Theresa May to Trigger Brexit on March 29,” accessed April 2, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/britain-theresa-trigger-brexit-week-170320114515225.html. 
30 Wheeler and Hunt, “Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU.” 
31 “Britain’s Theresa May to Trigger Brexit on March 29.” 
32 Daniel Boffey and Jennifer Rankin, “EU’s Chief Negotiator Challenges Theresa May Directly over Brexit Talks,” 
The Guardian, March 22, 2017, sec. Politics, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/22/eus-chief-
negotiator-sets-three-conditions-for-brexit-trade-talks-to-start. 
33 This discussion of the Brexit negotiations includes all relevant, important information made public by April 1, 
2017.  
 19 
Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter 2: The Literature 
         
This chapter discusses the literature on transformations of the state, including the 
academic conversation on national identity and sovereignty in the context of globalization and 
the EU. National identity has transformed and reacted to the growth of the supranational regime. 
Simultaneously, the roots of traditional national identity — ethnicity, culture and customs —
have been stressed, and new, alternative forms of identity have emerged. Additionally, the 
emergence of supranational institutions and decision-making has changed the ways states assert 
their sovereignty; they have to take into account the power and influence of supranational bodies. 
Today, many states, including EU member states, must acknowledge the effects national actions 
have on the wider, supranational community. Additionally, states are subject to the enforcement 
of laws and regulations from “above.” Brexit is the most recent example of how expressions of 
identity have been affected by transformations of the state. This literature provides the academic 
building blocks necessary to understand the historical and political significance of the Brexit 
vote. 
 
Chapter 3: British Euroscepticism and National Identity  
 
This chapter contextualizes the Brexit vote. In many ways, the result of Brexit sent 
shockwaves around world, as it put the fate of economic and political systems in a state of 
unprecedented precariousness. Despite the fact that the Brexit decision reflects a history both of 
ambivalence towards the EU and tensions over what British national identity is — a history that 
helps explain why Brexit occurred in the first place — a Brexit was still largely unexpected. This 
chapter therefore considers how a deep-seated cynicism towards European integration brought 
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the UK to the brink of crisis. The independence referendum becomes less of a shocking moment 
in time, and, rather, the manifestation of a final point of tension in a volatile relationship.  
This chapter begins with a discussion of the relationship between Britain and the EU, 
including when and why Britain’s membership began. This overview transitions into a more 
detailed examination of what animated British Euroscepticism from the 1950s to present day. 
Subsequently, two notions of British national identity will be considered, the New Right and the 
New Labour views. It will be argued that the New Right view is more consistent with 
Eurosceptic, nationalist attitudes, ones that favor Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Lastly, these 
two notions of Britishness will be put in conversations with subnational identities in order to 
further highlight the internal competition over identity that has been taking place within the UK, 
itself a multinational country.  
 
Chapter 4: The Identity Politics of Brexit 
 
Although this project focuses on Brexit as a single case study, my analysis tells a larger 
story. Considering the Brexit vote as a moment in time when Britain declared “this is who we 
are,” this project examines the role identity played in the decision to leave the EU. While neither 
British Euroscepticism nor competing notions of Britishness are new, my analysis demonstrates 
that the rise of New Right Britishness was, in part, provoked by three points of tension: (1) shifts 
of sovereignty from member states to the EU, (2) the rise of immigration, and (3) anti-elitist 
sentiments among the British working-class. This analysis draws on opinion polls, newspaper 
articles and campaign speeches. In doing so it becomes evident that these three issues 
contributed to the victory of the New Right vision of identity and, ultimately, the British voters’ 
decision to leave the EU. Additionally, this chapter outlines and theorizes how tensions 
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surrounding national identity contributed to the role each of these issues played in Britain’s 
decision to leave the EU. 
 
Chapter 5: Confronting Exclusionary Identity Politics  
 
 Brexit is a consequence of the ascendancy of New Right Britishness. While it is nearly 
impossible to say what a Brexit means at this point in time, it is clear that in some significant 
way the British people want to “take back control” of their country. If we understand Brexit to 
be, in part, a reaction to anxiety over transformations of the state and challenges to the nation, 
Brexit is at the same time about restoring national homogeneity — one British people no longer 
threatened by the “other.” Significantly, such anxiety is not unique to Britain. We see it in the 
United States with the election of Donald Trump, and across much of Europe with the rise of far 
right extremist movements. I conclude this analysis by suggesting that in order to combat both 
the rise in “new right” politics and the consequences of such (Brexit), it is necessary to reimagine 
traditional notions of belonging. Conceptions of membership to both the state and the nation 
must reflect the globalized nature of present day.       
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Chapter 2: The Literature  
 
As supranational institutions, including the EU, have developed over the past few 
decades, the academic conversation on transformations of the state has expanded.34 This relevant 
body of literature speaks to the ways in which the actions of an individual state are now situated 
within a larger system of regional and global governance, and under an umbrella of supranational 
laws and institutions. Scholars have increasingly argued that although states continue to play a 
crucial role in determining and maintaining their own legal and economic order, supranational 
institutions are now able to influence state actions in unprecedented ways.35 This chapter outlines 
this scholarship, focusing specifically on the section of the literature that discusses 
transformations of national identity and sovereignty. Importantly, the EU plays a major role 
within this conversation, despite the fact that such statutes may conflict with national legislation, 
as member states are held accountable to laws and regulations enacted by the European Council.  
By examining how academics have written about sovereignty and national identity this 
literature review demonstrates that: (1) national identity has transformed in response to the 
growth of supranational bodies. At the same time the roots of traditional national identity — 
ethnicity, culture and customs — have been stressed and new, alternative forms of identity have 
emerged. And, (2) that the emergence of supranational institutions has changed the ways states 
assert their sovereignty; they now have to take into account the power and influence of 
supranational bodies. Today, EU member states, must acknowledge the effects decisions made at 
the national level have on the supranational community. The reverse holds true as well. As state 
are subject to the enforcement of laws and regulations from “above,” policies passed by the EU 
                                                        
34 Lydia Morris, “Globalization, Migration and the Nation-State: The Path to a Post-National Europe?,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 48, no. 2 (1997): 192–209, doi:10.2307/591748. 192.  
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effect domestic affairs. The literature on transformations of the state in the era of globalization 
provides the academic building blocks necessary to analyze the issues that contributed to 
ascendency of New Right Britishness. Britain itself has experienced such transformations.  
2.1 Transformations of National Identity  
 
Part I of this literature review outlines the academic conversation on how the era of 
globalization has challenged national identity. The literature tells us that while some national 
identities have absorbed European discourse, rebranding themselves as transnational, others have 
sought to challenge the rise of supranationalism, reinforcing exclusionary criteria for 
membership to a national community. These two transformations have happened both within 
states and between them. In this sense, the politics of belonging has become a central aspect of 
this segment of the academic conversation on transformations of the state.36 This section begins 
with a conceptualization of national identity. Next, it considers ways national identity has 
transformed, in general as well as within the EU.  
 
Conceptualizing national identity  
 
 Identity is understood to be fluid and multifaceted. The characteristics by which we 
define ourselves often change over time, and any given community or group may have multiple 
ways of identifying themselves. That said, Parekh (2000) suggests that identity be conceptualized 
as “those features and relationships that are constitutive of us and define and distinguish us as 
certain kinds of persons.”37 Insofar as identity distinguishes us as certain kinds of persons, it also 
exposes the ways acts of exclusion are inherent to feelings of belonging. Young (1986) suggests 
that in order to establish a defined group (i.e. a national community), it is necessary to separate 
                                                        
36 Croucher, Globalization and Belonging. 36.  
37 Bhiku Parekh, “Defining British National Identity,” Political Quarterly 71, no. 1 (January 2000): 4. 4.  
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favorable and unfavorable characteristics. Identity becomes dependent on a set of criteria, 
borders that distinguish those who belong from those who do not. As will be elaborated below, in 
Britain, for example, the ability to speak English is a prerequisite to the New Right view of 
British national identity.  
Young further argues that a consequence of identity is that it can be used to suppress 
heterogeneity.38 The ability to be perceived as British, to exude Britishness, is contingent upon 
one’s embodiment of a specific set of traits and mentalities. Inherently, this means that deviation 
from the norm, insofar as it perceived to be a threat to these traits and mentalities, is 
unacceptable. This self-characterization, however, the pronouncement of the criteria necessary to 
hold an identity, almost always comes about through rejection of traits one knows one is not. “I 
am not X, so I must be Y.” By defining itself in relation to what it is not, identity ensures the 
continuance of a homogenous “Us.” Only Y’s can and will be Y’s. Additionally, this “Us” must 
be protected from the Other, from “Them” who are not “Us,” and are thus a threat to “Our” 
identity. Young asserts that it is in this moment that identity opens to door to hate, fear, 
intolerance and, ultimately, exclusion.39 
National identity applies this description of identity to a specific space and the people 
inhabiting this space; “national identity is the identity of a political community and refers to the 
kind of community it is, its central values and commitments, its characteristic ways of talking 
about and conducting its collective affairs, its organizing principles and so forth.”40 This echoes 
Young’s thinking that a community is “a group that shares a specific heritage, a common self-
                                                        
38 Iris Marion Young, “The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference,” Social Theory and Practice 12, no. 
1 (1986): 1–26.4.  
39 Ibid. 22.  
40 Parekh, “Defining British National Identity.” 
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identification, a common culture and set of norms.”41 In this sense, sharing an identity with 
others entails mutual understanding and affirming of one another. Through doing so, we come to 
acknowledge that we live in community with those we share an identity with; “persons identify 
only with some other persons, feel in community only with those, and fear the difference others 
confront them with because they identify with a different culture, history and point of view on 
the world.”42 This same logic can be applied to a national community, stressing national 
homogeneity and a need to maintain distance from the “other.” That said, there are many 
different kinds of nations. For some, belonging is rooted in blood, while for others civic 
nationalism is stressed. While nations involve the sense of belonging to a national community, 
this sense of belonging can be more or less inclusive. Racism, ethnic chauvinism and class 
devaluation are thus at times products of nations and nationalism.  
General Transformations of National Identity  
 
The academic conversation on transformations of national identity in the era of 
globalization was initially characterized by a debate. Some scholars argued that globalization has 
reduced the extent to which people identify with a national community. Others asserted that the 
opposite had happened.43 As with the discussion on sovereignty, scholars, over the past decade, 
have moved beyond this initial dispute. In many ways the nature of the relationship between 
globalization and national identity depends on how you define both concepts as well as the 
methods used to examine this interaction. That said, it is evident that priority given to national 
identity has, to some degree, been altered.44 “The spread of transplanetary relations 
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has…furthered a growth of micro-nations on a substate scale, region-nations of a suprastate 
scale, and transworld national diasporas.”45 Processes and effects of globalization have in this 
sense invited a pluralization of identities, expanding networks of both being and belonging.  
In a study that examines how globalization relates to individuals’ feelings towards 
national identity across sixty-three countries, Ariely (2012) asserts, “higher levels of 
globalization are related negatively to national identity.46 In this sense, widespread dissemination 
of ideas and information, as well as an open flow of goods and capital within a nation has caused 
people to disregard ethnic aspects of national membership. That said, this suggests that as 
national homogeneity decreases it not only becomes more difficult for a single form of national 
identity to remain dominant, but the population of this nation may believe it less important that it 
does so. The value placed on national identity by individuals therefore appears to be open for 
debate.   
Transformations Within the EU 
 
This academic conversation includes a debate on the relationship between a supranational 
European identity and senses of belonging on the national level. The focus of this literature has 
been on “the extent to which top-down attempts to socialize EU citizens have succeeded in 
creating an EU identity,” and, subsequently, on “the competition between national and EU 
identities.”47 The viewpoints presented by academics are divided into two principal arguments: 
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(1) “the impact of the EU on national identity [is] a threat” and (2) the impact of the a European 
identity “reinforce[s] national identities.”48  
Supranational identity endangers national identity as it challenges the monopoly the 
nation holds over the concept of identity. This serves as the first critical point of tension between 
national and supranational identity. In part, this is because “while national symbols are accepted 
as an evident extension of national narratives, the European symbols, in comparison, tend to 
appear hollow.”49 As EU member states have long, deep national histories, the EU struggles to 
produce as significant symbols of collectivity. In this sense, the EU’s attempt to generate cultural 
artifacts has attacked the nation’s claim to identity and senses of belonging. In short, this line of 
thinking is rooted in the assertion that although the EU is an organization based on the 
membership of states, European identity seeks to transcend national identity. The extent to which 
this has been successful, however, is open for debate. In Britain for instance, Britons both 
embrace and reject Europeanness within their own national identity. That said, due to its ever-
expanding geographic boundaries, lofty supranational aims and considerable political power, the 
EU is competing with the state for people’s loyalty. Consequently, Harris (2011) suggests that 
the role of the state has given way to the rise of European integration; “the challenges faced by 
contemporary European societies — security, economy, ecology — can no longer be met by 
individual states and that it is time to acknowledge the decline of the traditional nation and its 
monopoly on people’s identity.”50 
The other side of this debate suggests that although national identity no longer manifests 
in the same way it used to, the emergence of a European identity is not necessarily a threat. Both 
European and national identity have effected one another, interacting with and reacting to shifts 
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in sovereignty from the state to EU institutions. At the national level, “national identity has 
ceased to fulfill the function of social integration; the nation no longer fits into the sphere of the 
state, providing the latter with an identity and cultural legitimation.”51 Notions of national 
identity fall short of encompassing increasingly global perspectives and relationships. This has 
created space for the emergence of a European identity, reinforcing the idea that identities and 
the identities people hold on to are fluid, rather than fixed and unchanging.52 Delanty (2003) 
therefore proposes that national identities are simply becoming more cosmopolitan, in a way that 
supports the rise of a European supranational identity.53  
Keating (2004) furthers this conversation, arguing that processes of European integration 
have “provided incentives to national minority parties to rethink their ideology and policy stance, 
to adapt to functional change, and to seek a place in the new European architecture.”54 In this 
sense, European discourse and fragments of a European identity have become a part of 
nationalist movements and identities. Keating asserts that the continuation of European 
integration and thus the emergence of a European identity have had a direct effect on the nation 
and national identity. This effect, however, has not necessarily been negative. Rather, aspects of 
the nation, including national identity, have been rebuilt through an external projection of the 
state as “part of a European family.”55 Although “at times it looks as though the state itself will 
disappear…it is precisely [its] ability to externalize problems that allows it to stay together in 
some form.”56 The rise of supranational identity has therefore prompted transformations of 
national identity, and has not render them obsolete. 
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2.2 State Sovereignty 
 
The contemporary conversation on the relationship between globalization and the state 
has moved beyond debates over whether or not globalization has undermined the state as a 
political body.57 It is now apparent that juxtaposing globalization and the state is problematic. 
Doing so perpetuates a “presumption of zero-sum logic, [which has] led many commentators to 
mis-identify globalization as the major source of policy constraints, to overstate its 
‘transformative’ (read ‘weakening’) impact, and to minimize its diverse outcomes.”58 This 
juxtaposition establishes globalization as inherently threatening to the state, eliminating any 
discussion of nuance in this relationship. Since at least 2000 academics have shifted this 
conversation, emphasizing that globalization and states coexist; they interact with, and react to, 
one another. As a result, the discussion on transformations of state sovereignty has been 
developed. 
I have organized this discussion into three categories (1) the emergence of supranational 
institutions; (2) the loss of state controlled resources, and (3) shifts in value identifications that 
have prompted greater global governance. These changes all highlight the extent to which 
political solutions are now being sought beyond the state. States must now acknowledge the 
effects national actions have on the supranational community as well as adhere to the laws and 
regulations from “above.” As a member of the EU, a state may be subject to policies that are not 
directly advantageous or favorable at the domestic level. EU Regulations are, for example, 
legally binding and must be implemented uniformly across member states.  
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Transforming State Sovereignty  
 
Sovereignty, defined by Ruggie (1986) as “the institutionalization of public authority 
within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains,” has given the state absolute authority within a 
territorially defined space.59 This has ideally involved the state having complete authority over 
economic, legal and political affairs. That said, the era of globalization has challenged these 
traditional manifestations of state sovereignty. Although state sovereignty has never been 
absolute, states have recognized it in each other. Since the mid-twentieth century this 
understanding of state sovereignty has been transformed. In the post World War II period, and 
with the emergence of the United Nations and other international organizations, states began to 
surrender some of their sovereignty in certain areas. The ECSC, for example, transitioned into 
the EEC and then the EU over the course of forty years. This transformation is symbolic of the 
shift in authority awarded to international and now supranational organizations. Each change the 
EU has undergone has had an affect on state sovereignty; the EEC established the Single Market, 
creating one market for member states, while the EU has introduced a number of institutions that 
now hold jurisdiction over issue areas traditionally controlled by the state.  
For Habermas (1999), the transformation of state sovereignty has meant, “that a state can 
no longer…provide its citizens with adequate protection from the external effects of decisions 
taken by other actors, or from the knock-on effects of processes originating beyond its 
borders.”60 Technological developments over the past several decades have, for example, made 
both international travel and communication increasingly accessible. In this manner, 
globalization has challenged the state’s ability to control the extent to which its population is 
subject to outside influences. Given these outside influences, Habermas is principally concerned 
                                                        
59 John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” ed. 
Kenneth N. Waltz, World Politics 35, no. 2 (1983): 261–85, doi:10.2307/2010273. 
60 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York, 199AD). 49 
 31 
with how globalization has threatened the state’s ability to legitimate its sovereignty. The state is 
now just one actor within the international community, one actor with sway over what happens 
within its own borders.  
 The emergence of supranational institutions, including the European Council, is one 
cause of transformations of state sovereignty. Hirst et al. (2015) argues that this shift has caused 
states “to function less as all-purpose providers of governance and more as the authors and 
legitimators of an international ‘quasi-polity.’”61 In this sense, states have become a player in a 
larger, global system of governance; decision-making has taken on a new supranational 
character. The European Parliament and European Council, responsible for finalizing EU law, 
exemplify the extent to which supranational organizations simultaneously demand and depend 
on state action. In this sense, globalization has both created and shaped the state’s relationship to 
global regulatory entities, effectively diluting the state’s claim to absolute sovereignty.62  
Much of the conversation on transformations of state sovereignty has been focused on 
how globalization has undermined the state by reducing “resources under national control for 
shaping economic outcomes.”63 Since 1990 the literature has discussed the extent to which 
production and exchange in our globalized world has erased national borders and challenged the 
state from an economic perspective.64 Neoliberal policies, for example, have posited the market 
as universal, making the world dependent on one market, rather than the market simply being 
one aspect of society.65 Scholars, including Ohmae (1990), Habermas (1999) and Brown (2015) 
point toward worldwide flows of capital as well as more integrated markets as examples of 
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changes that now cause the state to be dependent upon the international community for economic 
stability. Consequently, Habermas has warned: “These factors explain why states no longer 
constitute nodes endowing the worldwide network of commercial relations with the structure of 
inter-state or international relations.”66  
Lastly, as states have lost autonomy, “people’s value identification is no longer limited to 
the boundaries of a particular country.”67 More and more, people have begun to see, understand 
and empathize beyond borders. Zhicheng (2016) argues that in order for state actors to appease 
increasingly “globally” oriented constituents, they must establish commonalities between their 
own values and interests and the values of mankind as a whole.68 In this sense, shifts in value 
identification can be linked to greater importance being placed on global governance. Global 
governance is understood as the mechanism through which to foster collaboration and 
cooperation among governments, with the goal of addressing issues that are beyond the ability of 
states to deal with individually.69 Consequently, however, global governance inherently 
introduces external influences. The state must now navigate a wide range of actors, values, 
ideals, and economic and political structures.70 This can be evidenced in a number of ways, 
including the establishment of the EU and its governing institutions, both comprised of 
representatives from the twenty-eight different member states.  
Sovereignty Today 
  
In addition to the ways processes and effects of globalization have prompted 
transformations of state sovereignty overtime, the literature also comments on what state 
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sovereignty looks like today. Scholars including Stein (2016) ask, how, if at all, will it continue 
to transform? Stein addresses this question by acknowledging the well-understood paradox: 
“globalization entails cross-border flows and common policies whereas sovereignty implies 
independent autonomous states.”71 That said, Stein asserts that although globalization affects the 
ability of sovereign states to control internal policy outcomes and limits the policy instruments 
available to governments, international relations remains, in part, the domain of interacting 
states.72 In fact, history tells us that great powers have always engaged on an international level, 
opening borders for both economic and political reasons.  
Supranational institutions need individual states to claim legitimacy. The authority of the 
EU remains dependent on the compliance of individual states. Likewise, states need 
supranational bodies in order to solve the most pressing global issues of today; it is argued that if 
“state governance that does not draw on and learn from others it will find it hard to maintain 
long-term national order and social stability.”73 Although the EU is comprised of twenty-eight 
individual member states, many laws and regulations are imposed from the supranational level. 
The EU has complete jurisdiction over areas including commercial policy, competition rules and 
monetary policy for euro countries. It shares responsibility with member states over a host of 
other issues, including internal market rules; aspects of social policy; economic, social and 
territorial cohesion; agriculture; the environment; energy; freedom, security and justice; aspects 
of public health; and aspects of development cooperation and humanitarian aid.74  
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In this manner, the ways in which sovereignty is practiced today reflects the constraints that have 
been placed, not necessarily maliciously, on the autonomy of states.75 
Looking forward, the literature suggests that while many states have lost the ability to act 
independently, they remain pivotal institutions. This is remains especially true in relation to 
establishing effective institutions of global governance. Intrastate cooperation and collaboration 
is dependent on the willingness of individual states to participate and engage with each other in 
the first place. Supranational bodies remain at the mercy of the state. As will be discussed, the 
Brexit vote is an exemplarily example of the fragility of the current world order, and the 
reluctance of some states to participate in supranational institutions and systems. As both 
representative rule-of-law states and more authoritarian governments are actors in the 
international system today, international relations are subject to dramatic change.76 Future 
observance of the relationship between globalization and state sovereignty is thus of continued 
interests to scholars. 
Conclusion 
  
The chapter outlines the academic conversation on transformations of national identity 
and state sovereignty. Significantly, the literature on national identity suggests two opposing 
transformations. On the one hand, as the EU has attempted to cultivate cultural symbols and 
establish a supranational identity, some national identities have felt under attack. Consequently, 
these identities have reacted to the rise of supranationalism in a way that has reinforced 
exclusionary criteria for membership to a group. On the other hand, other national identities have 
made room for the inclusion of Europeanness in a national sense of self. Part II of this literature 
review tells us that state sovereignty has also transformed. The rules and conditions of 
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sovereignty have changed. Supranational institutions, such as the EU, now have the ability to 
regulate and influence the domestic affairs of member states. While states remain a major 
regulator and their dissolutions seems highly unlikely, the constituencies that they serve and the 
policy tools that they use have changed. In addition to the emergence of supranational 
institutions, these changes have been caused by the loss of state controlled resources, and shifts 
in value identifications that have prompted far greater global governance.  
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Chapter 3: British Euroscepticism and National Identity  
 
 Internal tension over (1) what it means to be British and (2) over British Euroscepticism, 
contrary to current claims about their “newness,” have existed for a considerable period of time 
prior to the Brexit vote. This chapter therefore offers a discussion of both these tensions, 
contextualizing the Brexit vote in a history of identity crises and Euroscepticism. Significantly, 
two notions of British national identity will be considered, the New Right and the New Labour 
views. It will be argued that the New Right view is more consistent with Eurosceptic, nationalist 
attitudes, ones that favor Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. Lastly, this chapter will examine the 
New Right and the New Labour view of Britishness as they exist within subnational identities in 
order to further highlight the internal competition over identity that has been taking place within 
the UK, itself a multinational country.  
Part two of this chapter begins with a more general discussion of the relationship between 
Britain and the EU. This overview transitions into a more detailed examination of what animated 
British Euroscepticism from the 1950s to present day. From Churchill to Blair to Brexit, 
Britain’s history is one of notable reluctance and skepticism towards full economic, political, and 
social integration into the EU. By providing a brief overview of Britain’s relationship with the 
EU, the following pages trace the trajectory of this skepticism, a trajectory that ends with the 
Brexit vote. Considering the ebbs and flows of British Euroscepticism helps explain why Brexit 
occurred in the first place. The independence referendum becomes less of a shocking moment in 
time, and, rather, the latest manifestation of a deep-seated cynicism towards European 
integration.  
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3.1 British National Identity  
 
It is important to keep in mind that there is a constant shifting of identities within 
communities at both the local and national level. What it means to be British is not static. It has 
evolved and changed over time, and the ways in which Britons have seen themselves in relation 
to Britishness has likewise evolved and changed over time. For example, British imperialism 
changed British national identity. As the British state expanded geographically, British national 
identity did as well, reconfiguring itself to embrace new territories. This is evidenced by British 
appropriation of aspects of Indian culture. Curry, for example, is the national dish of Britain. 
Significantly, Britain was considered to be at the height of its power during its colonial rule. 
Therefore, the “inclusive” nature of British national identity at this time could be attributed, in 
part, to Britain’s ability to dictate the terms of this inclusiveness. British state sovereignty was 
unchallenged and the nation retained the authority to adopt only specific aspects of other 
identities. The more Britain flexed its colonial muscles, the more being British has become 
connected to being a member of a global superpower. In this sense, while the New Right and 
New Labour views discussed below are not the only ways to think about British national identity 
today, they are helpful in understanding the issues that led to a fifty-two, forty-eight divide 
within in the country.  
Competing National Identities    
 
Today, two notions of Britishness are in tension with one another. Bhikhu Parekh, 
political theorist and Labour member of the upper house of the British Parliament, has labeled 
these two identities the New Right and New Labour views. These labels come from Parekh’s 
belief that the New Right and New Labour views of Britishness are connected to Britain’s 
Conservative and New Labour parties, respectfully. Conservative elites, including Enoch Powell 
 38 
and Margaret Thatcher, have found themselves competing with New Labour representatives, 
such as Mark Leonard, to spread their preferred version of Britishness.77 Importantly, however, 
other scholars and politicians have referenced similar notions of British national identity without 
explicitly using Parekh’s labels. Rather, two competing forms of Britishness have been discussed 
more abstractly. That said, this analysis uses Parekh’s New Right and New Labour as they 
adequately acknowledges a politico-social divide that exists through Britain.  
The New Right view of Britishness contains both civic and ethnic dimensions. In terms 
of civic criteria, New Right Britishness stresses that British citizenship, English language 
proficiency, and parliamentary sovereignty are all necessary.78 These aspects of civic identity 
have been emphasized since the 1707 Act of Union — the act that brought England and Scotland 
together to form the UK. The Act of Union stipulated that English customs and institutions be 
favored, and that Scotland adopt English currency, weight and measuring standards, trade 
regulations, duty on goods, and customs on import and exports.79 Additionally, the House of 
Commons, located in London, has, since 1707, been considered “the personification of the 
people of Britain; its independence is synonymous with their independence.”80 The significance 
assigned to the House of Commons created a fear of devolution of traditions and power. 
Consequently, today, parliamentary sovereignty remains a fundamental aspect of New Right 
Britishness.  
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The New Right view also stresses ethnic criteria, including a patriotic sense of loyalty to 
the homeland and a strong sense of a “homogenous ‘we.’”81 This “we” includes British citizens 
who speak English, respect British customs and traditions, and defend British parliamentary 
sovereignty. Enoch Powell took a radical stance on these issues, stating “unless those who did 
not belong were returned to their ‘proper’ countries, there would be ‘rivers of blood’ in 
England.”82 Although Thatcher and other future proponents of the New Right view have not 
taken such a drastic position, this conception of Britishness provides room for the fostering of 
negative attitudes towards immigrants and perceived “others”; this is a part of Britishness that 
contradicts and conflicts with the qualified inclusivity imperialism allowed for.  
In terms of Britain’s relationship with Europe, there is disagreement among proponents 
of the New Right. While Powell adamantly opposed European integration, Thatcher signed the 
Single European Act. This statute essentially established the Single Market, a hallmark of the EU 
today. Falling somewhere in between Thatcher and Powell, William Hague (British Conservative 
politician) argued that “Blair’s project of modernizing Britain relegated Britain to part of the EU 
and involved Britain giving up its rights to make its own laws, to have its own currency and to 
set its own interest rates.”83 In this sense, even within the New Right notion of Britishness there 
are noticeable differences in opinion. This further highlights the logic of a multiplicity of British 
identities. A fierce sense of attachment to Britain as a territorially bound state only applies to 
some of these identities, and then only in varying degrees. The relationship between British 
national identity and the EU will be further elaborated by the discussion of British 
Euroscepticism below.  
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In contrast, the New Labor view offers a different idea of British national identity. While 
it also includes important civic and ethnic components, it emphasizes pluralism, inclusivity, and 
individualism. The rights and liberties of the individual are cherished, and New Labour focuses 
on justice, multiculturalism, and a forward-looking, multi-ethnic Britain.84 New Labour 
Britishness has therefore noted the importance of tolerance, cultural plurality, and hospitality; 
Britishness is for everyone, and everyone should be comfortable being British. This has led to 
the New Labour belief that part of Britain’s political power comes from equal partnership with 
England, Scotland, Wales and, to a certain extent, Northern Ireland.85 This introduces a major 
point of contention with the New Right view, as Blair argues, “it is not parliamentary sovereignty 
but parliamentary democracy that is central to British identity”86 (emphases added).  
To qualify this seemingly idealist identity, the New Labour view of Britishness is 
exclusionary in its own right. Those who identify with its criteria tend to be Londoners, young 
urban elites who have branded themselves as “cool.”87 In this sense, a degree of intolerance can 
be found within the New Labour view, as it implies that “those citizens who do not display 
enterprise, creativity and other desired qualities are not fully British.”88 Problematically, this 
contradicts New Labour’s supposed position that Britishness is for everyone.  
Subnational Identities 
 
It is difficult to discuss the aspects or dimensions of a British national identity without 
acknowledging that Britain itself is multinational. In fact, Kumar (2003) argues that British 
identity did not even materialize until the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707, which formally 
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established the united kingdom of Great Britain.89 The signing of the Union necessitated the 
bridging of differences between England and its new sister nation, Scotland. Bringing the nations 
of the UK together, under one collective identity, was considered a way to increase the 
prominence and status of the newly formed kingdom. How the subnational identities of the UK 
have conflicted with and reinforced both the New Right and New Labour conception of 
Britishness is significant. Interestingly, the age of British imperialism only further propagated a 
sense of urgency to unite and unify nationals, both those within the UK and in its colonies 
abroad. It was the goal of imperial Britain to establish an empire of Britons, one people to grow 
and prosper and become more powerful than rival states. Since 1982, however, it has been noted 
by scholars that a significant cohort of English, Welsh, Scottish, and northern Irish nationals do 
not think of themselves as British.90 Consequently, the original project of colonial Britain — the 
creating of a “common transnational ethnicized Britishness” — has been undermined.91 This 
rejection of Britishness by inhabitants of the British Isles themselves is considered to be 
problematic by both the New Right and New Labour views.  
England: In many ways England and Britain have been conflated. Today, in both 
journalistic and academic writing, the words “England” and “Britain,” “English and British” are 
used interchangeably.92 Although up until the end of the nineteenth century, “Britishness” 
trumped “Englishness,” when Britain’s colonial ventures slowed it become almost a general rule 
to mark all major events and achievements of national life as English and not British. 
Additionally, England began to cultivate a distinct English historiography, clarify and code the 
English language, expand the “great tradition'' of English literature, and celebrate a particular 
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type of landscape as quintessentially English.93 As England has done so, it has taken in Britain 
and the British Empire.94  
There are multiple understandings of Englishness. For older citizens living outside major 
urban areas, Englishness remains attached to the renewed sense of importance and influence it 
gained after “subsuming” Britain after the fall of the British Empire. For younger generations, 
however, English national identity “is an alien phenomenon, invented elsewhere and thankfully 
kept at bay from English shores.”95 This has resulted in a persistent denial about the very 
existence of nationalism and national identity within England; “so many outsiders and 
‘foreigners’ have been involved in the elaboration of it that Englishness is best considered as 
something made from afar, from outside England.”96 In relation to Brexit, “in England, Leave 
voters (39%) were more than twice as likely as Remain voters (18%) to describe themselves 
either as “English not British” or “more English than British.” Remain voters were twice as 
likely as leavers to see themselves as more British than English.”97 Here, it is possible to discern 
New Labour’s idea that Britishness can and must be for everyone. This introduces an interesting 
dynamic between the prioritization of subnational and national identities with Britain itself — a 
dynamic that is emblematic of the tensions between national and supranational identity.  
Scotland: Unable to define Scottishness through language, religion or race, there is a 
fierce sense of Scottish statehood; “the lack of clear, ‘objective’ demarcators does not hinder the 
strength of Scottish identity.98 This has led to the establishment of education and legal systems, 
civil services, and a “common weal” of Scottish values that are not only separate from Britain’s 
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but provided an escape from the clutches of Britain .99 It is thus unsurprising that “in Scotland, 
Remain voters (55%) were more likely than Leave voters (46%) to see themselves as “Scottish 
not British” or “more Scottish than British.”100  
In an attempt to reconnect the Scottish with a sense of loyalty to the UK, political leaders 
including Gordon Brown and David Cameron have promoted British values and forgotten 
institutions within Scotland.101 The Scottish National Party (SNP), however, a nationalist and 
social democratic political party in Scotland that campaigns for Scottish independence, has, 
labeled such efforts as attempts to “sell” Britain to those outside of England. Consequently, 
“very few Scots see themselves as primarily British, whereas nearly three-quarters consider 
themselves ‘mainly’ or ‘only’ Scottish.”102 Additionally, Scotland has become increasingly open 
to further European integration, offering a counterbalance to the overwhelming power of 
England. Despite the fact that the 2014 Scottish independence referendum was voted down, its 
occurrence makes a bold statement about how Scots see themselves in relation to Britain.  
In this regard, the imperial project of Britain, one which centuries ago sought to unite England, 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales, is still today unrealized. Within Wales England’s oldest colony, 
“Welsh consciousness can be found in all ranks of society.”103 In this manner Britain is home to 
a true multiplicity of identities; competing notions of Britishness at both the national and 
subnational level have continued to undermine the establishment of one cohesive national 
identity. 
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3.2 Britain and the EU 
 
The idea of a European union began with the desire to create a peaceful, united and 
prosperous Europe.104 This aspiration can be traced back to the post World War II period. 
Following the catastrophe of the Second World War there was a push to prevent the reoccurrence 
of violence among European states. In 1951, this push resulted in France, Germany, Italy the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 
(ECSC). The ECSC sought to establish a supranational system of governance over Europe’s coal 
and steel industries.105 The community’s decision to reduce direct state control over the 
production of coal and steel — materials necessary for manufacturing weapons — emphasizes 
Europe’s attempt to avoid a third world war. 
In Post War era, Britain took notice of France and Germany’s recovering economies.106 
During this regrowth period, known as the Golden Age, France and Germany were more 
successful than Britain in catching up to states that were less affected financially by the war. In 
part, France and Germany’s recovery was attributed to the development of effective 
manufacturing markets.107 Within Britain, the economic stability of neighboring countries 
increased national support, among both politicians and those suffering financially, for joining the 
European Coal and Steele Community (ECSC). Britain initially voted down entry, however, as 
many Britons did not see themselves as European nor see the European project as worthy of 
joining. Rather, Britain saw itself more closely connected to the Commonwealth and the United 
States. The UK was “content for the Europeans, among whom they did not necessarily see 
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themselves, to press ahead with integration.”108 That said, by 1970 this began to change. Britain 
began to acknowledge the benefits of being able to influence processes of European integration. 
If the European Economic Community (EEC) was to become a more formal political union, as 
former Prime Minister Edward Heath suspected, the UK wanted to voice in decision-making 
processes. Britain’s final decision to join the EEC in 1973 can therefore be interpreted as a 
power move, a strategic maneuver made in order to gain greater influence in the region.109  
A History of Euroscepticism  
 
Euroscepticism has been conceptualized in two distinct yet overlapping ways. Hard 
Euroscepticism is “based on principled opposition to the project of European integration as 
embodied in the EU; in other words, based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational 
institution such as the EU.”110 Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, involves “opposition to 
the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that 
the EU is planning to make.”111 Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) stipulate that further extension of 
competencies include: the development of supranational European institutions that would hinder 
national sovereignty, an increase in the number of EU member states, an increase in EU 
responsibilities, a change in the balance of authority between the EU and its member states, and a 
change in EU economic and monetary policy.112 As will be clarified, Brexit exemplifies a 
moment of Soft Euroscepticism insofar as Britain does not fundamentally oppose the European 
integration project. Rather, it appears to object only to certain aspects of European integration, 
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including the growing number and influence of EU institutions. Brexit thus represents a moment 
in time where Soft Eurosceptics were able to convince a majority of the country that a continued 
expansion of the EU threatened British national identity. It is important to note that scholars have 
engaged with the concept of Euroscepticism extensively.113 Although academics utilize different 
terminology — hard, soft, right-wing, and left-wing, and frame their discussion in various ways, 
(i.e., Euroscepticism and political parties, Euroscepticism and the masses) — there is consensus 
that Euroscepticism is tied to a need to protect and revitalize national identity and sovereignty.114  
Although the term Euroscepticism was coined in the 1980s, Eurosceptic sentiments in 
Britain can be traced back to Winston Churchill. Since the time of his leadership, British foreign 
policy has prioritized English-speaking peoples and the Empire-Commonwealth over Europe.115 
The European element was seen as unnecessary and constrictive to the realization of Britain’s 
global destiny. Since Churchill “Europe has been constructed and perceived as a ‘choice’ for the 
British who can apparently be ‘in’ or ‘out’ of Europe and more often than not ‘semi-detached’ 
from it.”116 Through policy initiatives that pushed a pro-Britain narrative, Churchill was able to 
effectively introduce Eurosceptic sentiments across Britain.    
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Since Britain joined the EEC it has been labeled an “awkward partner” of Europe.117 
Awkwardness in this sense is rooted in Britain’s ambivalence towards its involvement in the EU. 
As will be discussed shortly, this ambivalence is evidenced by Britain’s decision neither to use 
the euro nor to join the Schengen Area. EU citizens living within the Schengen Area — a block 
of twenty-six countries that have abolished the passport and any other type of border control — 
enjoy the privilege of unrestricted movement.118 Additionally, Britain has further demonstrated a 
level of hesitation by more consistently favoring engagement with the EU in moments when 
doing so appeared to advance national interests. For example, Britain has historically endorsed 
majority voting on issues considered to be financially beneficial for the UK, but has opposed 
such voting in other policy areas including foreign affairs and security.119 “[I]n the first case the 
British leaders considered the application of the voting rule of qualified majority as beneficial to 
their economy, while in the second case such a development was seen as a threat to national 
sovereignty.”120 This support of majority voting in specific instances reflects Britain favoring its 
own national interests. In this sense, Britain’s inclusion in an integrated Europe has arguably 
been spurred by self-interest to regain the economic security it enjoyed before the World Wars.  
By the mid 1970s, Euroscepticism in Britain had increased, as there was great debate 
over the extent to which membership to the EEC would benefit Britain’s economy. In 1975, a 
divided British Labour government held a leave referendum.121 This vote was largely driven by 
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controversy over membership in the Common Market.122 While large corporations and the 
consumer sector argued that access to the EEC’s market would increase revenue and job 
production, sectors of the Labour Party remained adamant that it would only raise prices and 
deplete Britain’s wealth. In contrast to Brexit, however, on June 5, 1975, 67.2 percent of 
Britain’s eligible voter population chose to remain in the EU.123 As the ‘Yes’ vote was fairly 
even across the country, intrastate tensions were kept to a minimum. Despite the majority ‘Yes’ 
vote the decision to remain a part of the EU was more of a statement about Britain’s continued 
economic position than it was a ringing endorsement of the EEC.124 At the time, Britain was 
focused on financial growth and the reestablishment of economic stability. In this sense, leaving 
the EEC was perceived as dangerous. “Thus the 1975 referendum did not, as many then 
imagined, settle the issue of British membership.”125 Since then, Eurosceptics in Britain have 
been calling for another vote, claiming that too much power has been transferred from the British 
parliament to Brussels.126  
 The outcome of the 1975 referendum provided the pubic upset necessary to further 
reinforce the notion of Euroscepticism within Britain. While Margaret Thatcher was in office, 
“the British attitude towards the EC has turned into a zero-sum game where any British 
concession in the direction of further integration was seen as another loss of national 
sovereignty.”127 Eurosceptics, for example, saw Thatcher’s signing of the Single European Act 
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(SEA), as a threat to national sovereignty, the job market, and general domestic growth.128 The 
SEA expedited the elimination of barriers to free trade among member states, effectively 
establishing the Single Market. Although Thatcher signed the SEA, she was wary of a European 
superstate that could subordinate Britain’s political system. Thatcher thus fought for a reduction 
in Britain’s overall contributions to the EU’s budget and adamantly defended British sovereignty 
within the EU context.129  
As contradictory as it may sound, Thatcher was not fundamentally opposed to European 
integration as a general project. Rather, she supported an integrated Europe, comprised of 
independent, sovereign states, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. According to 
Thatcher, member states must reserve the right to change direction if EU policy seems 
detrimental to national interest. Thatcher’s model of support for the EU therefore rejected 
European federalism that would damage British interest and was based on active cooperation 
between autonomous member states.130 Active cooperation between autonomous member states 
would allow for a “wider, freer, more flexible Europe…a wider Community in which different 
countries came together for different purposes on different occasions.”131 Likewise, “[s]he 
believed that European political cooperation would help reinforce Western Europe’s global 
standing and would strengthen Britain’s international position.”132 Thatcher’s involvement with 
the Single Market Act, however, was interpreted by Eurosceptics as a British commitment to 
European integration. Although Eurosceptics were unable to lobby for an exit referendum in 
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1983, this period did allow for the gathering of evidence to convince others of the duplicity of 
the integration process.133  
Following Thatcher’s time in office, the Conservative Party was divided between anti- 
and pro-European proponents. Britain was ready for a peacemaker. John Major was viewed as an 
ideal compromise candidate, one that would unite the Conservative Party by calming tensions 
between pro- and anti-European party members, as he sought to “advance the substance of 
Thatcherism but with gentler style.”134 Major’s attempts to fulfill this role were initially made 
evident during his tenure as Thatcher’s Foreign Secretary. While Thatcher adamantly opposed 
the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), not to mention Britain’s 
involvement in it, Major favored an opt-in provision that would allow individual member states 
to decide whether and when to join.135 After being appointed Prime Minister in 1990, Major took 
a softer approach toward European integration. In doing so, he sought to “bury old differences in 
Britain between North and South, blue-collar and white-collar, polytechnic and university.”136 
Since World War II, upward class mobility in Britain has stagnated. This exaggerated  “very 
clear strata in [British] society, each with different levels of social, cultural and economic 
capital.”137 Major attempted to ease these class tensions by continuing to advocate for opt-in 
clauses, which would allow member states to consider national interests before adhering to EU 
policy.  
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Major’s role as compromiser, however, did not go unchallenged. During this time, Rupert 
Murdoch, an Australian-American entrepreneur who enjoyed significant control over large 
media companies, led the way in creating a climate of fear around European matters that severely 
tested the leadership qualities of even nominally pro-European prime ministers.138 Murdoch’s 
interests in impeding British relations with the EU were rooted in a desire to limit competition 
and maintain a monopoly over British media. For example, he attacked Major for attempting to 
forge a more perfect union with the EU. Murdoch’s complaints mirror those of Major’s critics 
more generally. Former Thatcher Conservatives believed Major only supported their more 
Eurosceptic views when the legislation in question was not substantial.139 He was portrayed as a 
flake, defending European integration when the stakes were high, i.e., at the signing of the Treaty 
of Maastricht, and making Eurosceptic noise only when perceived necessary for holding the 
party together. Ultimately, Major’s failure to reunite the Conservative party led to the end of his 
time in office.  
In 1997, Tony Blair and his New Labour Party won the general election. In many ways, 
Blair’s success during the election can be attributed to Major’s shortcomings, specifically his 
inability to unite the Conservative Party. Upon appointment, Blair pushed pro-European 
discourse, vocally advocating for a future across the Channel, a Britain encapsulated within 
Europe.140 Interestingly, as Blair advocated for British voices to be at the heart of European 
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affairs, public opinion toward membership fluctuated. “At one point there was a swing of 12% in 
just three months, from a 53%-32% lead for ‘stay’ to 46%-43% in favour of Leave between June 
and September 2000.”141 Given this fluctuation Blair was forced to reconsider European 
integration as an electoral liability.142 The Blair government realized that continuing to publically 
push a pro-Europe narrative would cause reelection issues. In this manner, while Blair still 
supported pro-EU policy, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, he also attempted to depoliticize the 
European question and to defer the making of conclusive decisions on contentious European 
issues.143 Significantly, the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred certain powers from EU member 
state governments to the European Parliament. These powers included legislating on 
immigration, civil and criminal laws and foreign policy.144 His time in office thus presents an 
interesting struggle faced by British politician. There is a need to balance both public support of 
the pursuit of EU integration and ever present expressions of Euroscepticism.  
Today, there are many explanations as to why Euroscepticism remains prevalent within 
Britain. Such explanations are inextricably linked to globalization, and thus transformations of 
the state. For example, “historic legacy as a world power still resonates and remains an important 
explanation for the continued belief among many British citizens, including political elites, that 
Britain is a separate entity and does not need to pursue a European destiny.”145 This fear of a loss 
of autonomy to Brussels has reinforced anti-Europe sentiments. Likewise, it has paved the way 
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for Soft Eurosceptics in Britain, as they gained support following the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), an act that solidified further development of the EU’s supranational 
dimension. In fact, since 1997, Eurobarometer pollsters have found that British support for the 
EU is not much more than half the EU average.146  
Acknowledging this brief chronology, it is evident that Britain’s entire history with the 
EU reflects a degree of hesitation and skepticism. For instance, in 1999 the Euro replaced the 
currencies of eleven European countries, culminating the process of economic and monetary 
union in Europe.147 The establishment of this monetary union finally realized the initial goals of 
the EEC laid out in 1971. Likewise, in 2007 the Schengen Area was created, effectively 
eliminating internal borders in nine of the current ten EU members state.148 As mentioned, 
however, Britain never replaced the pound with the euro, and does not participate in the 
Schengen Area; these decisions were made to appease a Eurosceptic public. This highlights 
Britain’s resistance to EU policy that reduces British autonomy.  
 In providing a description of British national identity and British Euroscepticism this 
chapter begs the question, why now? What changed within the UK that led to ascendancy of the 
New Right version of Britishness? Keeping my discussion focused on the role of British national 
identity, the following chapter addresses these questions. I examine why a Eurosceptic, yet 
stable, relationship was brought to a point of crisis, as well as why New Right British identity 
prevailed in the Brexit vote.     
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Chapter 4: The Rise of the New Right 
 
An ascendency of the New Right version of British national identity has driven the UK to 
withdraw membership from the EU. As has been discussed, neither British Euroscepticism nor 
competing notions of Britishness are new. Rather, anxiety over transformations of the state and 
challenges to the nation has caused Britons to embrace New Right Britishness as opposed to the 
New Labour view. This rise of the New Right can be attributed to (1) state sovereignty shifting 
from the UK to the EU, (2) immigration increasing and (3) anti-elitist sentiments persisting 
among the British working-class. The combination of these three issues, and the extent to which 
they polarized notions of British national identity, allowed New Right attitudes to prevail in an 
unprecedented way; the Brexit vote demonstrates that a majority of Britain identifies, at least 
partially, with New Right Britishness. My analysis focuses on these three issues because they 
were prominent throughout the Brexit campaign, suggesting that they were exceptionally 
important in the minds of voters. My discussion of the Brexit vote itself therefore becomes a case 
study of reactionary politics – a consequence of what can happen when New Right identities 
prevail.  
4.1 Analyzing the Issues in the Brexit Campaign 
Sovereignty  
  
The first campaign issue that can be connected to a rise of New Right Britishness is 
sovereignty. The desire to reclaim a certain level of power and influence on the world stage 
therefore served as subtext for the Brexit referendum. In this sense, Brexit offered New Right 
proponents an opportunity to declare: “the UK is not Europe,” it is its own autonomous and 
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powerful entity, detached from “the economic crises and hotbeds of extremism.”149 Nigel Farage, 
the former leader of UKIP, a political party whose views mirror New Right understandings of 
British national identity, advocated for Britain to reestablish itself as “a proud, patriotic country 
that has control of its borders, represents itself on the world stage and makes its own laws in our 
own sovereign Parliament.”150 Likewise, the Leave campaign itself argued that by withdrawing 
membership “we regain our seats on international institutions like the World Trade Organisation 
so we are a more influential force for free trade and international cooperation.”151 Continuing to 
be a member of the EU would thus further challenged British sovereignty and sense of self. 
Given the rhetoric of UKIP politicians and the Leave campaign, Britons who hope to restore 
traditional notions of sovereignty and pursue national projects away from the laws and policies 
enforced by the EU — laws and policies some Britons believe have undermined the country’s 
global status — have embraced New Right attitudes.  
Strands of British national identity, including the New Right, has been both threatened 
and reinforced by perceived threats to the country’s status on the world stage. Over the past 
decade “the identities which arose from Union and Empire which underpinned the idea of 
Britishness for more than three centuries have been called into question by devolution, by 
decolonization, by immigration, and by European integration.”152 As British sovereignty has had 
to adapt to the influences of supranational governance, the ability of Britain to act in an 
autonomous and hegemonic manner has diminished. In this sense, a decline of global power has 
caused a crisis of British identity. This highlights the importance of the role of identity in relation 
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to issues surrounding a fear of a loss of state sovereignty and power within the international 
community. The strengthening of EU sovereignty is demonstrated by its ability to dictate the 
ingredients of chocolate to establish human rights standards. While the infamous thirty year 
Chocolate War may seems trivial, it highlights the extent to which EU institutions now have the 
authority to enforce interstate trade. Additionally, in the case of human rights, the European 
Commission ensures that judgments made by the Court of Justice are recognized in every 
member state. This has shaped a framework of human rights standards that member states are 
held accountable to. 
Additionally, for those who adhere to the New Right view, “national sovereignty is 
important because the Conservatives, too, want Britain to be one of the most admired and 
influential countries in the world.”153 The rise of subnational identities has, therefore, threatened 
what it means to be British. Increasing the power or autonomy of Scotland, Wales or England at 
the expense of Britain as a united polity is therefore dangerous. In this vein, William Hague, 
British Conservative politician and proponent of the New Right view, argues that battles over 
parliament sovereignty represent one point of conflict between the national and subnational 
identity in the UK. He asserts: “the British people I talked to on my campaign…are uneasy at the 
current political assault on our institutions, liberties and traditions; and they are alarmed at the 
rising tide of nationalism in Scotland, Wales and England.”154 
As generations of Britons grew up citizens of a major world power, a perceived loss of 
state autonomy increased anxiety over losing hold of what it means to be British. In fact, nearly 
half (forty-nine percent) of Leave voters said the single biggest reason for wanting to leave the 
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EU was “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK.”155 Significantly, 
during the height of the British Empire, for example, the country was perceived to be at its best 
and it ruled half the world. British influences were widespread and the ambition of establishing a 
united kingdom was being fulfilled. As one Leave voter commented, “from one canal to another, 
from the Suez crisis of 1956 through to the Panama Papers 60 years later, the stories of our lives 
in Britain have largely been a story of just how hard some of us find it to adjust to no longer 
being top dog.”156 Being British involved being a member of a country that was taken seriously. 
Today, however, Britain must adhere to laws and regulations passed down from Brussels. 
Although many Britons no longer have experience with the British Empire, for generations 
colonial narratives ran deep. This tradition of national power seems to have reached the eldest 
generations alive today, as older citizens who overwhelmingly voted “leave.”  
Given a national nostalgia for the independence, power and sovereignty Britain enjoyed 
during its imperial days, the Brexit vote provided an opportunity for proponents of the New 
Right view to restore what they believe it means to be British. As discussed above, to be British 
is to belong to a truly global power, one that enjoys absolute parliamentary sovereignty. As 
membership to the EU has been perceived to undermine such autonomy, Britons have expressed 
the inability to “recognize our country” and, consequently, to find meaning in the country’s 
national identity.157 While Britain’s position at the top of the global order may have been lost, the 
ascendency of the New Right suggests a deep desire for it to be regained, as the very essence of 
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Britishness hangs in the balance. Brexit thus became an opportunity for the New Right to attempt 
to reassert its understanding of British national identity.  
Immigration  
  
 Increased and diversified immigration into Britain has contributed to the rise of New 
Right Britishness. In order to support this claim this section (1) examines recent increases in 
immigration to both the EU and UK, (2) briefly considers who, historically, has been both 
included and excluded from British national identity and (3) analyzes opinion polls and argument 
made the Leave campaign regarding immigration.  
Today, Europe is an immigrant continent; that is, there are more people coming in than 
leaving. In 2014, 1.6 million citizens of non-member countries immigrated into the EU and 1.3 
million people with citizenship in one EU member state moved to another.158 By January 2015, 
there were 34.4 million people born outside of the EU member states living within them, while 
18.5 million people had moved from EU state of birth to another.159 As evidenced in Table 3, the 
number of asylum applications from fifteen countries has more than tripled since 2013. These 
numbers indicate that there has been a growth of migration into Europe, and EU member states 
more specifically, over the last several years. Between January 2015 and March 2016, Europe 
received approximately 1.5 million asylum applications.160 2015 therefore marked the largest 
annual flow of refugees into Europe since 1985, comparable only to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989 and the subsequent influx of refugees from East to West. 
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Table 3: Number of Refugees to Europe 2013-2015161 
Citizenship 2013 2014 2015 
Syria 49,000 125,000 378,000 
Afghanistan 23,000 39,000 193,000 
Iraq 9,000 15,000 127,000 
Kosovo 18,000 35,000 68,000 
Albania 11,000 16,000 67,000 
Pakistan 19,000 21,000 47,000 
Eritrea 20,000 46,000 46,000 
Nigeria 12,000 20,000 31,000 
Iran 11,000 10,000 27,000 
Somalia 18,000 16,000 21,000 
Ukraine 1,000 14,000 21,100 
Serbia 15,000 20,000 19,000 
Russia 36,000 14,000 19,000 
Bangladesh 7,000 10,000 18,000 
Gambia 4,000 12,000 13,000 
Other 151,000 182,000 230,000 
TOTAL 405,000 596,000 1,325,000 
 
As the number of people entering the EU has grown, the demographics of those arriving 
have become increasingly diverse. For example, Table 3 also shows that since 2013, Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq have become the top three countries contributing to those seeking asylum 
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in Europe. This represents a change in demographics, as previously the majority of asylum 
seekers came from Eastern European countries such as Kosovo and Albania. Across the board, 
migrants, immigrants and asylum seekers are predominantly young males (seventy-three percent) 
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four.162  
The reasons people migrate to Europe are extensive. Typically they are simultaneously 
pushed and pulled by a combination of economic, political and social factors. That said, the 
conflict in Syria remains the biggest driver of migration today. While ongoing violence in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, abuses in Eritrea and poverty in Kosovo have contributed to migration, 
Syrians have accounted for almost thirty percent of asylum applications. As will be discussed, as 
migration into the EU has become more diverse, including significantly more Middle Eastern 
nationals, the New Right has claimed that the “homogenous we” of British national identity has 
been threatened.   
Like the EU, immigration to the UK has been more extensive and more diverse in the 
21st Century than ever before. In 2004 the EU expanded to include ten new countries. These 
countries were dubbed the A8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia); the other two countries are Malta and Cyprus.163 Between May 2004 and 
May 2009, 1.3 million people migrated from A8 countries to Britain. “In the UK, A8 citizens 
were able to freely and legally take up employment from May 2004 as long as they registered 
with the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS).”164 Britain thus saw a great increase in the number 
of eastern European migrants crossing its borders. Presently, the Poles make up Britain’s largest 
foreign national group.  
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The introduction of the A8 was not the first time the UK had experienced increasing and 
diverse immigration. Between the end of World War II and the turn of the century, 
approximately three million people from Africa, the Pacific Rim, the Caribbean and the Indian 
Subcontinent.165 This influx of migrants began after World War II because faced a labor shortage 
during the Post War era. Needing workers to revitalize its economy, Britain extended an 
invitation to hundreds of laborers. Although the country sought to attract white Europeans, large 
groups of Caribbean descent migrated to the UK. Additionally, until 1968, Britain had a policy 
of welcoming Commonwealth immigrants.166 This open-door policy had allowed people from 
the Commonwealth countries, including India, Pakistan, Australia, Nigeria and many Caribbean 
Islands, to migrate to Britain. In 1968, however, the British Parliament “deprived UK citizens of 
Asian origin of the right to enter and live in the country whose citizens they were and remain.”167 
This was seen as a racial measure, a response to increased anxiety among white Britons that New 
Right ethnic conditions of Britishness were being challenged.  
By 2015, inflows of EU nationals migrating to the UK stood at 269,000, up from 264,000 
in 2014.168 Net migration of EU citizens was estimated at 184,000 in 2015, an increase from 
174,000 in 2014.”169 Likewise, in 2015 non-EU citizens accounted for forty-four percent of all 
inflows to the UK.170 Despite Conservative efforts, the number of people coming to live and 
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work in the UK from the rest of the world not only exceeds those from the EU but it has also 
increased. 
The fear that surrounds migration to Britain today is not new. It has a deep-seated history 
in the country, reignited over the years by periodic increases in the number of migrants arriving. 
Looking back to 1945, the perceived fear has been caused by the “implication that something 
culturally British was being injured, probably fatally.”171 For generations, white Britons have 
tested migrants, looking for ways to force them to prove their loyalty to Britain. “In the First 
World War, Jewish men were under severe pressure to join the army to ‘prove’ that they were 
Britons first and Jews second.”172 Additionally, proponents of exclusionary notions of British 
national identity have supported English-language proficiency tests and proof of knowledge of 
British history. These tests were the result of a national myth established after World War II, a 
myth that used British resilience during the war to foster a sense of national community. A 
snapshot was taken of 1945 Britain, the Britain that was a member of the victorious Allied 
Forces. It is the members of this Britain who were at the time and are today welcome and 
included in understandings of British national identity.  
World War II “is taken to evoke the British at their best, the qualities of Churchill’s 
‘island race’… It helps construct a sense of nation and nationality that excludes the bulk of post-
1945 immigrants.”173 Thus, when Black and Asian migrants began arriving in higher numbers in 
the 1950s and 1960s, Britain had already formed a sense of national identity, one that did not 
include these newcomers. During this time Enoch Powell was well supported in the late 1960s as 
he “saw black immigration as destructive of the very existence of Britain.”174 Powell argued that 
                                                        
171 Paul Ward, Britishness Since 1870 (Psychology Press, 2004). 125.  
172 Ibid. 115.  
173 Quoted in Ward, Britishness Since 1870. 124.  
174 Ward, Britishness Since 1870. 113.  
 63 
Britain “must be mad…to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are 
for the most part the material of the future growth of immigrant-descended population.”175 This 
implies that not only were immigrants viewed negatively, but their children and descendants 
were as well. 
As more people entered Britain since World War II and the EEC transitioned into the EU 
in 1993, public anxiety over immigration rose.176 Beginning in the late 1990s, monthly polling 
data from the IpsosMORI agency showed that people identified immigration as one of the top 
three most important issues facing the UK; in 2016, it was the issue picked most often by survey 
respondents.177 In this sense, opposition to immigration within Britain is a very salient issue. In a 
public opinion poll from April 2016, seventy-six percent of respondents wanted immigration 
reduced in general, and seventy-two percent thought that the government was right to impose 
numerical limit on it.178 Likewise, while fifty-two percent said that the government should try to 
reduce immigration by “a lot,” eighty-one percent thought that the government should limit 
benefits to migrants resident in UK for less than two years.179 Evidently, voters want the country 
to control immigration.  
As both Muslim refugees and European economic migrants have continued to arrive in 
the country, their presence has been labeled a threat to national security and economic stability. 
Significantly, British voters began to identify immigration and border control as among the most 
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important issues facing the country.180 In a statement given by Boris Johnson, Britain’s current 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the politician argued, 
 
People have every right to question why we can't control our borders. We need to answer 
those concerns by taking back control of those borders. But we must also face the fact 
that the system has spun out of control. We cannot control the numbers. We cannot 
control the terms on which people come and how we remove those who abuse our 
hospitality.181  
 
In this sense, the idea that Brexit was solely about sovereignty and not also xenophobia is a 
misleading claim. Issues surrounding sovereignty are intrinsically connected to a fear of “others” 
infiltrating state borders. This suggests that a New Right understanding of immigration, one that 
portrays immigrants as a formidable challenge to national identity has spread throughout the UK. 
Migration has triggered exclusionary expressions of British identity — aspects of British identity 
that can be linked to the New Right tradition and the belief that heterogeneity and diversity are 
challenges to the national community. Immigration has thus become a scapegoat for the dilution 
of Britishness.  
In response to this perception that tising migration has changed the demographics of 
Britain, threatening the homogenous “we” that is critical to the country’s national identity. 
According to numerous polls and researchers, the majority of Britain wants to see a reduction in 
immigration. This statistic included fifty-five percent of Remain voters. The general public’s 
desire for reduced migration can be connected to fears surrounding potential threats to British 
identity. For example, ninety-five percent of respondents to an April 2016 opinion poll indicated 
that that it was very important or fairly important for migrants to speak English in order to 
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become “truly British.”182 Additionally, this same poll illustrates that one of the most important 
requirements for living in Britain includes a respect for British culture and customs.183 In this 
context, British culture and customs involves the English language, Christian religious life and 
the English parliamentary system.  
A recent increase in support for UKIP further highlights the extent to which the British 
public has been displeased by contemporary migration trends. UKIP, founded on an anti-EU 
platform in 1993, received a majority of UK seats in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. 
As these elections take place once every five years, UKIP will enjoy significant representation at 
the EU level through the Brexit negotiation process. Significantly, “70 percent of UKIP 
supporters identify immigration as the most important issue facing the UK, compared to 45 
percent of Conservative voters and just above 25 percent of Labour voters.”184 In part, emphasis 
on immigration concerns has been prompted by general questions regarding security. Following 
the Paris and Brussels attacks of 2015, for example, Leave proponents argued that withdrawing 
membership from the EU would allow Britain to increase border security and ultimately reduce 
terrorist threats.185 Thus, as British membership to the EU protects freedom of movement for EU 
citizens, UKIP has adamantly supported the Brexit vote.  
A key outcome of Brexit would be to give Parliament back control of British borders. In 
this manner, the government has expressed its unwillingness to compromise with the EU on 
matters pertaining to immigration. Theresa May has even explicitly stated: “We will have control 
of our borders, control of our laws.”186 Returning to the earlier discussion of identity, such 
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widespread disapproval of migration can be characterized as British rejection of the migrant 
“Other.” The New Right within Britain appears to believe that in order to restore and protect the 
homogeneity and purity of Britain those who lack the necessary traits of Britishness must be 
excluded from the national community. In this context, those coming from the Middle East, 
North Africa and within the EU itself are not compatible with what it means to be British. 
Anti-elitism and the Economy  
 
This section introduces the third cause of the ascendency of the New Right: anti-elitist 
sentiments. Significantly, we live in an era of seething resentment towards elites. From Trump to 
Sanders, from Syriza in Greece to Podemos in Spain, from the resurgence of the Austrian and 
Hungarian far right to the rise of the Scottish independence movement, the world is rejecting 
political elites’ ties to the “establishment.”187 Within Britain specifically, working-class 
resentment towards elites has grown over time, perpetuating the sense of a disconnect between 
the two socio-economic groups’ experiences of Britishness. “How can the less privileged 
majority relate to someone who is alien to their experiences?”188 For Britain’s working class, 
they cannot. Thus, in an act of desperation to protect their inclusion in a British national 
community, the working-class seems to have embraced the New Right view as it opposes New 
Labour’s support of cosmopolitan policy, policy enacted by the same elite class that has 
continued to thrive despite the economic suffering of many. Given such sentiments this section 
examines how, since 2008, tensions between the working-class and elite have only increased.  
Contemporary anti-elitism in Britain can be traced back to the Great Recession and its 
aftermath. Both caused economic stress for the working-class. In order to revitalize the economy 
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after 2008 Britain relied on austerity policies. Problematically, however, investors, banks and big 
corporations disproportionately benefited from such measures. As a result, economic recovery in 
the UK has been concentrated in large metro areas including London.189 While middle and upper 
class professionals have enjoyed economic prosperity since 2009, the working class has 
experienced stagnant wages, social benefit cuts and increased job competition from immigrants 
entering the country.190 “Trade unionism has been neutered, local government is a shadow of its 
former self and political activism is, for the most part, simply shouting into the wind.”191  
In addition to the domestic financial trouble, Britain has had to be patient over the last 
eight years while many of its major trading partners have scrambled to recover. The eurozone 
countries experienced large budget deficits, high debt levels, and uncompetitive cost 
structures.192 This led to uncertainty regarding the EU’s ability to effectively address periods of 
economic distress. In fact, eight years later, eurozone countries are still experiencing financial 
difficulties.193 Consequently, Britons began to believe that the EU had stagnated and if Britain 
remained a member it would too. In this sense, there has been a growing perception that Britain 
has been collateral damage in the wake of European economic failures. This has reinforced 
Eurosceptic sentiments and made the New Right’s anti-integration platform increasingly 
attractive.194   
In response to this slow economic recovery, Britons who reside in northern cities and 
small towns began to feel as though they live in a very different world with very different views 
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than the younger elite voters that predominately live in larger metropolitan areas.195 Britain’s 
working-class believes that its position within society is being threaten by this growing cohort of 
young urban elites. Significantly, World War II helped make the working-class in Britain 
fundamental to the country’s stability, as “the stoicism of the people in the blitzed cities and the 
bravery of a conscript army transformed the position of the working class.”196 The working class 
became the common people, the backbone of society, “taking up their new and now apparently 
rightful place in the national community.”197 Given this newly granted position in society, the 
working class today feels as though young elite politicians have diluted Britishness through 
enacting cosmopolitan policies. Those who identify more closely with Powellian isolationism 
have harbored long-standing resentment towards British elites, as it is thought that Thatcher’s 
signing of the Single European Act was the result of a push by Britain’s upper class.198 The 
product of this resentment was unveiled in 2016, as Brexit became, in part, a working-class 
rebellion. 
As the working-class has experienced alienation caused by elitist policies, their sense of 
belonging to the British nation has been further undermined by the presence of foreign workers. 
It is therefore imperative to acknowledge a degree of xenophobia underlying these economic 
tensions. Increased racism and intolerance directed at migrant workers represents an effort to 
restore national homogeneity and the white British worker’s rightful place in the work force — 
an effort indicative of support for New Right Britishness. In this manner, the resentment felt by 
the working-class was only furthered by tolerant policies that allowed migrant workers, Muslims 
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and other ethnic minorities, and refugees and asylum seekers to enter Britain.199 Consequently, 
the working-class’s need to preserve its Britishness has resulted in intense racism towards these 
individuals. Eastern European immigrants, for example, have experienced acts of xenophobia 
and bullying in both the workplace and at school. A Polish teenager in Cornwall even committed 
suicide as a result of racist bullying at school just a few weeks before the Brexit vote.200 
Likewise, British Chinese workers are worried about the aftermath of Brexit and how their place 
in society, rights and livelihoods may be negatively affects.201  
The rise of New Right Britshness was caused, in part, by the perception that political 
elites do not listen to nor represent the people. Support for the New Right therefore represents an 
effort to restore a sense of British national identity that favors the socio-economic experiences of 
the working-class — consequently rejecting the cosmopolitan attitudes of New Labour. Britain’s 
working-class became tired of being called racist, ignorant and backward-looking because it has 
vocalized concerns about decreasing job security and the moving of employers to city centers. 
The Brexit vote thus reflects a deep frustration caused by the alienation of the British working 
class. As the proletariat, or the wageworkers, formed the foundations of the Brexit coalition, a 
vote for Brexit symbolized a vote against the Oxford and Cambridge elite.202  
4.2 Strength of the New Right Tradition   
 
  Britain’s New Right and New Labour notions of national identity are in tension with one 
another. On the one hand, the New Labour view attempts to promote plurality, to further connect 
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a sense of Britshness with the EU and a set of cosmopolitan policies. Young Britons from urban 
areas who have propagated this notion of Britishness are less attached to civic criteria of national 
identity. The New Right has, however, fought back. It has appealed to nostalgic Britons, those 
who supported Powell and Thatcher’s New Right vision for the country. This vision included an 
autonomous, self-governing UK—a Britain that acknowledged the European integration project 
but did not directly partake in it. 
Although the outcome of the independence referendum was extremely close, the Brexit 
vote demonstrates that the New Right view of national identity is prevalent throughout the 
country. Given the civic and ethnic conditions the New Right view advocates for, there is a 
connection between New Right Britishness and Britain’s decision to leave the EU that cannot be 
ignored. As highlighted by the above discussion, tensions over shifts in state sovereignty, 
increased immigration and a persistent anti-elitism have allowed New Right views to gain favor 
among Britons. Whether or not there is explicit understanding of the New Right view, labeled as 
such, there is apparent support for certain conditions of British identity within the county, 
conditions that have resulted in fifty-two percent of voters checking the Leave box. 
Brexit was, in part, about reestablishing the rules and conditions that allow the country to 
foster a strong sense of self. As made evident by the narrow margin by which Leave won the 
vote, there is a deep divide within the UK over what it means to be British. While the three 
issues analyzed in this chapter have existed since before Britain joined the EU, recent events 
have exacerbated anxieties. Such events have included the continued expansion of the EU, 
geographically and in the number and scope of institution, the Syrian refugee crisis, and the slow 
economic recovery of EU member states after the 2008 recession. The culmination of these 
events, and other like ones, created an exceptional moment in time, one that allowed for New 
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Right Britishness to rise in such a way that David Cameron had to follow through on this 
promise to hold an independence referendum.   
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Conclusion: Confronting Exclusionary Identity Politics 
 
On March 29, 2017 Theresa May gave notice that the people of Britain wish to trigger 
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, officially beginning the formal withdrawal process. The 
seemingly unlikely break up of Britain and the EU is now a reality. But what has the outcome of 
the independence referendum told us about the British people? What do we learn about the 
Brexit vote by considering the role identity played in the decision to leave? I have argued that the 
country does not agree about whether or not Britishness includes membership to the EU. 
Focusing on identity and identity politics frames Brexit as the manifestation of or reaction to 
deep-seated, internal tensions over what it means to be British. This domestic dispute came to a 
point of crisis on June 23, 2016 because the power and scope of supranational intuitions – the EU 
– had increased, consequently transforming British state sovereignty and challenging British 
national identity. 
Since 1951, a united Europe has evolved from a coal and steel community allied to 
prevent future violence between European countries, to a socio-political polity. The EU today is 
a massive consortium of Commissions, Parliaments and Courts, each with a unique authority to 
dictate what life within Europe looks like. EU Regulations, for example, are binding legislative 
acts that must be applied in their entirety across member states. Although many EU Directives 
are largely unenforceable, increasing oversight at the supranational level continues to influence 
intra-European relationships. For fifty-two percent of the British people, transforming state 
sovereignty had threatened parliamentary autonomy, strong border control and a traditional 
working-class. Consequently, this perceived threat was an affront to national identity, and 
therefore contributed to their decision to vote Leave.  
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5.1 Turning our Backs 
 
Understanding the reasons why the Brexit vote occurred in the first place, as well as why 
the Leave campaign was victorious, is crucial to addressing potential consequences. On a 
practical level, interpreting the economic, political and social grievances of fifty-two percent of 
the country will inform both policy responses to Brexit and the UK’s relationship with the EU 
moving forward. Problematically, both Britain’s decision to leave and the policies that are likely 
to be passed will have damaging effects, physically and psychologically, on both British citizens 
and citizens of other nations. What does a Brexit say to British citizens of immigrant descent? 
And for those who look towards Europe as a place of economic and familial security, what 
precedent does Brexit set for how refugees and migrants will be treated? As Britain 
declares  “We are British and not European,” or “We are British before we are European,” such 
questions loom, demonstrating that both states and national borders are still fundamental to our 
understanding of political authority and international relations. 
Brexit raises concerns about the consequences of exclusionary identity politics and 
restrictions placed on the freedom of movement. If we understand Brexit to be, in part, a reaction 
to domestic debates over what it means to be British, it can be argued that Brexit was at the same 
time about restoring national homogeneity — one British people, no longer threatened by the 
“other,” be it European, Muslim or Cosmopolitan. British national identity, while fundamental to 
the very existence of the British state and people, is at the same time so fragile it can be 
compromised by the arrival of an immigrant from another country. As this analysis suggests, 
however, there are deep issues at stake in regards to the promotion of exclusionary identity 
politics. What happens when a state feels the need to seal its borders and strictly dictate who 
belongs and who does not? What happens when the doors are closed and backs are turned on the 
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world’s most vulnerable populations? In both serious and intuitive ways this very well may be a 
consequence of the Brexit. The “masks” politicians so often hide behind have been removed, and 
mainstream discourse is now infused with xenophobic rhetoric. 
Deep ideological divides about what it means to be belong to a nation have driven 
reactionary politics and invited the proliferation of promises to “make America great again,” and 
to “take back control” of Britain. While the explicitly racist language used by heads of state may 
make the consequences of a Brexit or Trump presidency seemingly obvious, such potential 
outcomes still demand our attention. These mantras introduce dangerous contradictions, 
discrediting entire national histories founded on generations of immigration and ushering in 
xenophobic nationalisms. In terms of the refugee crisis that has unfolded over the course of the 
last two years, exclusionary identity politics and xenophobia ignore the stark realities of 
“refugeeness.” Instead of acknowledging and then acting on the fact that these refugees are 
running away from war and persecution and toward the hope of a better life, this vulnerable 
population has instead been portrayed as a danger to existing social structures, policy, cultural 
attitudes, and, ultimately, to nationalist ideals. 
5.2 Challenging Traditional Notions of Belonging 
 
The era of globalization, of transforming state sovereignty, has demanded the conception 
of citizenships that achieve both individual equality and the recognition of collective difference. 
Citizenship, as a component of national identity, has, since antiquity, involved exclusion.203 That 
said, the state’s ability to strictly dictate who resides within its borders has changed as the 
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mobility of people has increased.204 This has affected the capacity and willingness of both state 
and citizen to meet obligations traditionally inherent in modes of citizenship.205 The ability of 
states to fulfill responsibilities has been weakened, and citizens have new avenues or outlets for 
protection of rights and facilitation of mobility. In this sense, there are “growing opportunities 
and rights outside of the sovereign, territorial state,” the EU being one such option.206  
In response to the alteration of institutions of power, transforming state sovereignty and 
the simultaneous expansion and concentration of peoples, technologies, and expressions of 
thought, citizenship and ways of belonging to the state must change. This has provided the basis 
for the emergence of global or transnational citizenship — alternative notions of citizenship that 
take into account that many people now belong at various levels to different societies. In this 
sense, the challenge is to integrate the global, regional, and local dimensions of belonging into a 
new political model. It is necessary to devise forms of democratic political participation that 
transcend state boundaries.207 
Transnationalism has become one new mode of belonging, a mode that is removed from 
traditional ways of belonging to, and thus identifying with, the nation-state. Castles (2002) 
asserts that transnational communities are groups whose identity is not primarily based on 
attachment to a specific territory. Rather, transnationalism is, in part, characterized by the 
creation and maintenance of social fields that cross national boundaries.208 It involves the 
negotiation of identities at the intersection of a “three-way relationship between their sending 
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state, their host state and their network of fellow transnationals.”209 It therefore presents a 
powerful challenge to traditional ideas of national belonging, as transnational citizens participate 
in multiple political communities, typically not identifying with one particular place at any given 
time.210  
Global or post national citizenship is an additional framework useful for combating 
exclusionary identity politics and traditional conceptions of membership to a state. It is largely 
about taking a risk and pushing beyond the comfort of background, language, or nationality — all 
which typically shield us from the reality of others. This calls for greater inclusivity as a defining 
feature of cosmopolitanism, as it suggests that all humans belong to one moral realm or domain, 
presupposing obligations to each other. Kant’s Kingdom of Ends reiterates this description of 
cosmopolitanism, as it assumes greater inclusivity rooted in hospitality and global peace.211 
Thus, this reality would involve welcoming strangers and maintaining a tolerant civilization. 
        Of course, the challenge remains how to reconcile the prevalence of the New Right view 
in Britain with a need to reimagine what belonging looks like. Despite the existence of 
frameworks for transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship, application and feasibility are in 
many ways insurmountable challenges not unique to the British people. This project began with 
the acknowledgement that my decision to analyze the role of identity in the Brexit vote stemmed 
from an attempt to pull together many interests, to pose questions that force us to reflect on and 
critique the world we live in. While questions such as, “is the world ready to open borders and 
minds? Are nationalist, exclusionary politics eradicable?” are certainty loaded they can be 
answered quite simply. No. The world is not ready to open borders and minds. Nationalist, 
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exclusionary politics are not at this time eradicable. Despite this bleak prognosis, there is comfort 
in the fact that understandings of belonging seem to be in flux. There is room for both refugees 
and Britons coming out of the Brexit to conceptualize new ways of claiming membership to both 
local and distant communities. If not at the level of the state, alternative forms of belonging will 
be forged on the ground, defying the will of those who seem so determined to turn their backs on 
human decency.  
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